Date | Topics | Reading |
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Games, Equilibria, and Computation | ||
Wed, Aug 28 | Course overview. Two-player games. Zero-sum, min-max = LP duality. | Overview slides and notes. Notes by Prof. Costis Daskalakis on Two-player games, Zero-sum games, min-max = LP duality. |
Fri, Aug 30 | Nash Eq. in bimatrix games, Characterization, enumeration, existence, reduction to symmetric game. | My hand-written notes. Notes by Prof. Costis Daskalakis on Two-player games. |
Wed, Sept 4 | Lemke-Howson algorithm, Sperner | Notes on Lemke-Howson algorithm. Slides on Sperner. |
Fri, Sept 6 | Class PPAD and other TFNP classes, iterated dominance, and correlated equilibrium | For complexity classes see Slides. For iterated dominance and CE see Slides. |
Wed, Sept 11 | Other equilibrium ((coarse) correlated, stackelberg) and game (extensive form, Bayesian) notions. | See Slides. |
Fri, Sept 13 | Security games and stackelberg equilibria. Nash bargaining | For material covered on security games, see Paper, Sections 3, Section 4 (only page 9), and Section 5 (before Lemma 5.2). For Nash bargaining see Slides 6-15 by Prof. Asu Ozdaglar, and also Section 8.2 (Chapter 8) of book Game Theory by Roger Myerson. |
Mechanism Design | ||
Wed, Sept 18 | Mechanism design w/o money -- top trading cycle. kidney exchange. stable matching. | Notes by Prof. Tim Roughgarden. Notes by Widmayer and Dutting |
Fri, Sept 20 | Single item auctions -- First and second price | Notes by Tim. |
Wed, Sept 25 | Single parameter auction. Myerson's Lemma | Notes by Tim. |
Fri, Sept 27 | VCG, Auction design to Algorithm design, Indirect Mechanism, Revelation Principle | On VCG, and notes on the rest by Tim. |
Wed, Oct 2 | Myerson's Optimal (Revenue maximizing) Auction, Bulow-Klemperer Theorem | Notes1 and Notes2 by Tim. |
Fri, Oct 4 | Prophet Inequality, Combinatorial Auctions | Prophet Inequality notes due to Tim, and Slides due to Brendan. Comb. Auction by Tim |
Wed, Oct 9 | Implementability of Comb. Auction | KC Auction by Tim |
Fri, Oct 11 | Walrasian Equilibrium | VCG+Walrasian Equilibrium by Tim |
Wed, Oct 16 | Case Study on Spectrum Auction | Spectrum Auc by Tim |
Fri, Oct 18 | Fair Division | For definitions see Section 1,2,3 except 3.2 from Notes by Endriss. Indivisible goods: for EF1 Section 3 of paper 1. For the remaining, Sections 3 and 4 (Lemma 1 for EFx) of paper 4. |
Selfish Routing, Congestion Games, Potential Games | ||
Wed, Oct 23 | Selfish-Routing and Price of Anarchy | Notes by Tim |
Fri, Oct 25 | Network Over-Provisioning and Non-Atomic Routing | Notes by Tim. |
Wed, Oct 30 | Cancelled | |
Fri, Nov 1 | Smooth Games | Notes by Tim on (i); this also includes smoothness proof for Location Games where players want to maximize payoff |
Wed, Nov 6 | Congestion games, Potential Games, Equilibrium Existence and Complexity of Computation. Cost Sharing Games | First part of Tim's Notes on Potential games. Notes by Prof. Kesselheim on complexity of computing NE in congestion games. Notes by Tim on Cost-sharing games |
Fri, Nov 8 | Best Response Dynamics. | Notes on best-response dynamics by Tim. |
Wed, Nov 13 | No-Regret Dynamics. | Notes by Tim. |
Fri, Nov 15 | Review Lecture/Swap regret | |
Wed, Nov 20 | Presentation: Stable Matching: Algorithms, Results and Open Problems Presentation: Housing Allocation with Budget Constraints |
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Fri, Nov 22 | Presentation: Analyzing GAN training with game theory Presentation: On finding fair allocation for chores Presentation: The stock market as a game |
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Wed, Dec 4 | Presentation: Strategic Behavior in Dynamic Matching Presentation: A Bisection Protocol for Political Redistricting on Planar Graphs Presentation: Research on Factoring's Relationship with TFNP Subclasses |
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Fri, Dec 6 | Presentation: A Trend in Games and Logic Presentation: Playing Poker with Game Theory Presentation: Market Dynamics Convergence |
Roth et al. (2004) also extend the TTC algorithm and its incentive guarantee to accommodate both deceased donors (houses without owners) and patients without a living donor (agents without houses). The application of graph matching to pairwise kidney exchange is from Roth et al. (2005), Roth et al. (2007) consider three way kidney exchanges, with simultaneous surgeries on three donors and three patients. Three-way exchanges can significantly increase the number of matched patients, and for this reason are becoming common. Allowing four-way and larger exchanges does not seem to lead to significant further improvements.
Date | Topics | Reading |
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Games and Equilibiria | ||
Lemke-Howson (path-following) algorithm to find a Nash equilibrium | Slides from a previous course. AGT book by Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardos, and Vazirani, sections 2.1-2.4, 3.1-3.6 | |
Mechanism Design | ||
Voting | Notes by Widmayer and Dutting. Notes by Tim | |
Selfish Routing, Congestion Games, Potential Games | ||
Fair Division | ||
Markets | ||
Market: Fisher, Equilibrium | Notes by Prof. Mansor. AGT book Chapter 5, Sections 1 and 3 | |
Eisenberg-Gale Convex Formulation, Kelly's resource allocation problem -- fair solution | AGT book Chapter 5, Sections 5.1-5.3, Section 13. Chapter 6, section 6.2. More notes will be posted. | |
Exchange Model: Existence, Convex formulation and auction based approximation algorithm for the Linear utilities case. | AGT book Chapter 5, Sections 5.11, 5.12, Chapter 6, Section 6.1.1. Chapter 3 (Section 3.3) of Notes by Prof. Bisin. | |
Market: Discrete-goods, Strategization | Slides. Sections 2, 3.2 and 4.1 of this paper. | |
(market equilibrium) Fisher markets, Eisenberg-Gale convex formulation, an overview of Devanur-Papadimitriou-Saberi-Vazirani (DPSV) algorithm. Arrow-Debreu market, PPAD-hardness, Lemke’s algorithm. |