

ECE 598HH: Advanced Wireless Networks and Sensing Systems


Lecture 18: Internet of Acoustic Things Haitham Hassanieh




*These slides are courtesy of Nirupam Roy (UIUC)



50 million voice assistants are sold in US









Google Apple amazon




nura
BOSE



QUALCOMM

The Future of Personal Audio



Google


Gesture



Johnson & Johnson



AUDIO SPOT LIGHT
QUALCOMM



PHILIPS



HEARABLES
CHALLENGE




Google Apple amazon

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BOSE

QUALCOMM

The Future of Personal Audio



Body vibration





AUDIO SPOT LIGHT
QUALCOMM



PHILIPS



HEARABLES
CHALLENGE



Holosonics: Pencil beam sound






Sensing



Computing



Communication



Inaudible Acoustics




Normal Sound
(< 24 kHz)



Ultrasound
(> 25 kHz)




BackDoor
(> 25 kHz)



“Alexa, open the garage door!”

A black megaphone icon emitting sound waves.

Inaudible Acoustics



**Audible
sound**
(**< 20 kHz**)



I heard it




Recorded it


**Designed
Ultrasound**
(**> 40 kHz**)



**Can't
hear it**



**Can
Record it**



Pseudo-ranging
 chirp.io SenSys'12

ApneaApp
 MobiSys'15

DopLink
 UbiComp'13



SoundWave
 CHI'12


AAMouse
 MobiSys'15

AirLink
 UbiComp'14


Spartacus
 MobiSys'13

Crowd-counting
 SenSys'12



Inaudible Acoustic Communication




Protecting Privacy (Inaudible Jammer)






Inaudible
jamming
signal



Threats: Inaudible Acoustic Attack































Nonlinear

$$V_{out} = a_1 V_{in}$$

$$V_{out} = a_1 V_{in} + a_2 V_{in}^2 + a_3 V_{in}^3 + \dots$$









Nonlinear

$$V_{out} = a_1 V_{in}$$

$$V_{out} = a_1 V_{in} + a_2 V_{in}^2$$





Nonlinear

$$V_{out} = a_1 V_{in}$$

$$V_{out} = a_1 V_{in} + a_2 V_{in}^2$$

$$V_{out} = a_1 V_{in} + a_2 V_{in}^2 + a_3 V_{in}^3 + \dots$$



Frequency


Nonlinearity is fundamental to all microphones



 $V_{\text{in}} = \sin F_1 + \sin F_2$




$$V_{in} = \sin F_1 + \sin F_2$$






$$V_{in} = \sin F_1 + \sin F_2$$





$$V_{in} = \sin F_1 + \sin F_2$$




$$V_{out} = a_1 V_{in} + a_2 V_{in}^2$$

$$\begin{aligned} (\sin F_1 + \sin F_2)^2 = & -\cos 2F_1 \\ & -\cos 2F_2 \\ & -\cos (F_1 + F_2) \\ & +\cos (F_1 - F_2) \end{aligned}$$



$$V_{in} = \sin F_1 + \sin F_2$$




$$V_{out} = a_1 V_{in} + a_2 V_{in}^2$$

$$\left(\sin F_1 + \sin F_2 \right)^2 = -\cos 2F_1 - \cos 2F_2 - \cos (F_1 + F_2) + \cos (F_1 - F_2)$$




$$V_{in} = \sin F_1 + \sin F_2$$




$$V_{out} = a_1 V_{in} + a_2 V_{in}^2$$

$$(\sin F_1 + \sin F_2)^2 = -\cos 2F_1 - \cos 2F_2 - \cos (F_1 + F_2) + \cos (F_1 - F_2)$$






$$V_{in} = \sin F_1 + \sin F_2$$




$$V_{out} = a_1 V_{in} + a_2 V_{in}^2$$


$$\begin{aligned} (\sin F_1 + \sin F_2)^2 = & - \cos 2F_1 \\ & - \cos 2F_2 \\ & - \cos (F_1 + F_2) \\ & + \cos (F_1 - F_2) \end{aligned}$$










$$V_{in} = \sin F_1 + \sin F_2$$














$V(t) = \text{“Alexa, open the garage door!”}$








3-5 ft

Can someone attack from a longer range?



High power makes ultrasonic speakers audible







Speaker's nonlinearity




Microphone's nonlinearity








Speaker's nonlinearity






Microphone's nonlinearity







Microphone's nonlinearity





Speaker Nonlinearity


$$a_1 V_{in} + a_2 V_{in}^2$$





Speaker Nonlinearity

$$a_1 V_{in} + a_2 V_{in}^2$$

$$a_1 v(t)\sin(\omega_1 t)$$








Speaker Nonlinearity

$$a_1 V_{in} + a_2 V_{in}^2$$

$$a_1 v(t)\sin(\omega_1 t) + a_2 (v^2(t) - v^2(t)\cos(2\omega_1 t))$$








Speaker Nonlinearity


$$a_1 V_{in} + a_2 V_{in}^2$$


$$a_1 v(t)\sin(\omega_1 t) + a_2 \left(v^2(t) - v^2(t)\cos(2\omega_1 t) \right)$$






$$a_1 V_{in} + a_2 V_{in}^2$$





Why not modify V_{in} to cancel out audible leakage?



Nonlinearity
+
Channel memory
+
Power dependency
+
Thermal noise



$$a_1 V_{in} + a_2 V_{in}^2$$

Non-invertible channel

Nonlinearity
+
Channel memory
+
Power dependency
+
Thermal noise



$$a_1 V_{in} + a_2 V_{in}^2$$


Non-invertible channel

Speaker leakage is unavoidable...


... motivating “Leakage Optimization”

Speaker Nonlinearity \rightarrow Audible Leakage

Speaker input




Speaker output




Speaker Nonlinearity \rightarrow Audible Leakage

Speaker input




Speaker output




Speaker Nonlinearity \rightarrow Audible Leakage

Speaker input




Speaker output




Speaker Nonlinearity \rightarrow Audible Leakage

Speaker input




Speaker output




Speaker Nonlinearity \rightarrow Audible Leakage

Speaker input




Chopping compresses the leakage band



Leakage from Speaker

Speaker input

Amplitude





Frequency
90k 100k



Speaker




Amplitude

$$\text{Maximize } \min_f [T(f) - L(f)]$$
$$\text{subject to } f_0 \leq f_1 \leq f_2 \leq \dots \leq f_N$$


Frequency
10k 20k 30k 40k 50k 60k 70k 80k 90k 100k








Inaudible voice commands: Long range



Speaker-array running leakage optimization


Applies to all microphone-enabled devices



Defending Inaudible Attacks


Core Question:

Is this a “non-linear signal” or normally recorded signal




Core Question:

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
Voice signal

$$v(t)$$

$$\left(v(t) \cdot \sin(\omega_1 t) + \sin(\omega_1 t) \right)^2$$

Core Question:

Is this a “non-linear signal” or normally recorded signal




Voice signal

$v(t)$


$$\left(v(t) \cdot \sin(\omega_1 t) + \sin(\omega_1 t) \right)^2 = v(t) + \frac{1}{2} v^2(t) + \dots$$

Core Question:


Is this a “non-linear signal” or normally recorded signal



$$\left(v(t) \cdot \sin(\omega_1 t) + \sin(\omega_1 t) \right)^2 = v(t) + \frac{1}{2} v^2(t) + \dots$$



Do not know the original signal ...
Hence, difficult to differentiate “non-linear signal”
from a noisy but legitimate sound signal





Do not know the original signal ...
Hence, difficult to differentiate “non-linear signal”
from a noisy but legitimate sound signal

However, voice signals present opportunities ...



Opportunity: Harmonic Structure in Voice > 50 Hz

Human Voice



Opportunity: Harmonic Structure in Voice > 50 Hz




Human Voice



Energy at
sub-50Hz band


Can sub-50 Hz signals reveal non-linearity ?

Sub-50 Hz signals preserves harmonics ...




Correlation

Leakage signal component is (+)ve amplitude



5000 Test Cases



To summarize...



Inaudible Acoustics is a new **primitive** ...

To summarize...




Inaudible Acoustics is a new **primitive** ...
that makes **inaudible** ultrasound **audible** to microphones

To summarize...



Communication



Privacy



Attack



Inaudible Acoustics is a new **primitive** ...
that makes **inaudible** ultrasound **audible** to microphones
Underpinning a wide range of IoAT applications ...