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Name _________________________________________
RETURN OF MATERIALS
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[ ] I will pick up my final exam and term paper in Room 437 of Loomis Laboratory of Physics on or after Tuesday, May 31.
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXAM
₯ This is a closed-book examination. You may take up to three hours to complete it.
₯ Write your answers in the space provided on these pages. If you need more room, write on the back of the page. Do not write on or submit any other pages.
₯ Answer 10 and only 10 of the 12 questions. All count equally. Please put an "X" in the score table below next to the two questions that you do not want graded. Otherwise we will assume you want us to grade the first 10 questions.
SCORES
1. 7.
2. 8.
3. 9.
4. 10.
5. 11.
6. 12.
TOTAL SCORE
FACTÊSHEET
Length: 1 centimeter (cm) = 0.39 inches
1 meter (m) = 100 cm = 39 inches
1 kilometer (km) = 1000 m = 5/8 mile
The radius of a nucleus is about 10-15 m or 10-13 cm.
Mass: 1 gram (g) = 1/29 ounce
1 kilogram (kg) = 1000 g = 2.2 pounds
Energy: 1 joule (J) = 1 watt-second = energy of 1 qt. water dropped 4 inches
1 MeV = 1.6x10-13 J
1 kiloton TNT = 1012 calories = 4.2x1012 J
Nuclides of interest: 1H (p) = normal hydrogen (H)
2H (p,n) = deuterium (D)
3H (p,2n) = tritium (T)
235U (92p,143n) = 0.7 % of natural uranium
238U (92p,146n) = 99.3 % of natural uranium
239Pu(94p,145n) = plutonium (artificially made)
Typical fission reactions: n + 238U ® n + n + 2 fragments + 200 MeV
(only fast neutrons induce fission)
n + 235U ® n + n + 2 fragments + 200 MeV
(all neutrons can induce fission)
The mass of the U-235 nucleus is 4x10Ð25 kg.
Thus 1 kg of U-235 contains
1 kg/4x10Ð25 kg = 2.5x1024 nuclei
57 g of completely fissioned material yields 1 kt
Typical fusion reactions: D + D ® 3He + n + 3.2 MeV
D + D ® 1H + T + 4.0 MeV
T + D ® 4He + 2n + 17.6 MeV
(basic reactions)
6Li + n ® 4He + T + 4.8 Mev
(catalytic reaction)
20 g of completely fusioned D yields 1 kt
1. Acronyms
Translate the following acronyms: [2 points each]
₯ ICBMÑintercontinental ballistic missile
₯ STARTÑStrategic Arms Reduction Talks
₯ MIRVÑmultiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle
₯ ASBMÑair-to-surface ballistic missile
₯ SCCÑStanding Consultative Commission
₯ IRMÑintermediate range missile
₯ GPSÑGlobal Positioning System
₯ GLBMÑground-launched ballistic missile
₯ SLCMÑsea-launched cruise missile
₯ SALTÑStrategic Arms Reduction Talks
₯ SLBMÑsubmarine-launched ballistic missile
₯ ACDAÑArms Control and Disarmament Agency
₯ GLCMÑground-launched cruise missile
₯ ASATÑanti-satellite weapon
₯ C3IÑcommunication, command, control, and intelligence
₯ SNDVÑstrategic nuclear delivery vehicle
₯ EMPÑelectromagnetic pulse
₯ SIOPÑsingle, integrated operational plan
₯ SVCÑSpecial Verification Commission
₯ EMTÑequivalent megatons
₯ SACÑStrategic Air Command
₯ NSCÑNational Security Council
₯ IAEAÑInternational Atomic Energy Agency
₯ CTBTÑComprehensive Test Ban Treaty
2. ThermonuclearÊWeapons
a) Shown here is a schematic diagram of a standard thermonuclear weapon. Indicate on the diagram the locations of the following key components:
₯ 6LiD fusion packet
₯ U-238 case
₯ Fission trigger
₯ Tampers
₯ Styrofoam and reflectors
[13 points]
b) Describe briefly the roles of each of these five components. [35 points]
6LiD fusion packetÑThe thermonuclear 'fuel' of the weapon. When exposed to neutrons, the 6Li acts as a 'catalyst', providing more neutrons and and tritium to fuse with the deuterium (D), releasing energy.
U-238 caseÑHas two purposes: holds the weapon together, increasing the yield of the fusion packet; fissions when exposed to the intense neutron flux from the fusion reactions, adding to the fission yield of the weapon.
Fission triggerÑProvides the X- and g-rays that compress and heat the fusion packet, causing the thermonuclear reaction to go.
TampersÑInside trigger, slows disasembly of fisile material. Between trigger and fusion packet, slows propagation of debris and shock wave from the fission trigger into the fusion packet, allowing time for the fusion reaction before the fusion packet is disrupted.
Styrofoam and reflectorsÑStyrofoam holds the fusion packet in place and, when exposed to the X- and g-rays from the fission trigger, creates a high-pressure plasma that helps to compress the fusion packet. Reflectors direct X- and g-rays onto the surface of the fusion packet.
3. WeaponÊEffects
Blast and thermal radiation [12 points]
₯ What peak overpressure (psi) is sufficient to destroy unreinforced brick and wood houses?
5 psi
At approximately what distance from a 1 Mt low-altitude airburst would this peak overpressure occur?
8 km (5 miles)
₯ What acute thermal exposure (fluence) is sufficient to cause third degree burns to exposed human skin?
8 cal cm-2
At approximately what distance from a 1 Mt low-altitude airburst would this fluence occur on a dry, clear day?
11 km (7 miles)
Ionizing radiation [36 points]. Give short definitions of the following terms:
₯ Acute exposureÑIn this context, exposure lasting less than 24 hours.
₯ Chronic exposureÑIn this context, exposure lasting more than 24 hours.
₯ Residual nuclear radiationÑIonizing radiation released by a nuclear weapon from 1 minute after the explosion onwards, often called "fallout".
₯ RadÑExposure to radiation that deposits 100 ergs of energy in each gram of the target. Applies to all types of radiation and all types of absorbers.
₯ Relative biological effectiveness (RBE)ÑFactor that converts the physical dose in rads to biological dose in rems. Depends on the type and energy of the radiation, the type of tissue, and the particular effect(s) of interest.
₯ LD50ÑThe acute radiation dose that, if received by a healthy individual, has a 50% probability of causing death or, if received by a given population, will cause death to 50% of the individuals in the population. About 450 rem.
4. NuclearÊPolicies
Give short (one or two sentence) definitions of each of the following nuclear policies and give the approximate time interval, if any, during which it was declared U.S. policy (you may specify the interval by giving a range of years or presidential administrations).
[8 points each]
₯ CounterforceÑA policy of emphasizing the ability to quickly launch devastating attacks on the leadership and nuclear forces of an adversary. Major elements of this policy include a large arsenal of prompt, hard-target killer weapons (powerful and accurate), a large menu of pre-programed targets, quick and effective early warning, communications, command, and control, and post-attack assessment capabilities, to permit shoot-look-shoot tactics to assure complete destruction of the adversary's forces. This has been operational U.S. policy since the mid-1960s and declared U.S. policy since the early 1970s.
₯ Assured destructionÑA policy of deploying secure retaliatory nuclear forces of sufficient size to destroy any adversary, even after a first strike is absorbed. The emphasis is on the security of the forces and command and control, and their sufficiency for deterrence. This was declared U.S. strategic policy during 1963Ð1973.
₯ First useÑA policy of attacking with nuclear weapons first, if one is losing a conventional war. This has been declared U.S. and NATO policy since the early 1950's. The term "first use" was introduced to avoid having to use the politically more unpalatable term "first strike" to describe this policy.
₯ Massive retaliationÑA policy of responding to even a small-scale conventional attack on oneself or one's allies with an all-out nuclear attack on the adversary. This was declared U.S. strategic policy during 1954Ð1962.
₯ Minimum deterrenceÑA policy of deterring nuclear attack by deploying only enough nuclear forces to cause unacceptable damage to the population and industry of any attacker. The emphasis of this policy is on avoiding an arms race while still deterring nuclear attack. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara reportedly considered 400 deliverable EMTs sufficient to deter the Soviet Union from attacking the U.S. This has never been U.S. policy.
₯ Flexible responseÑA policy of responding to any attack by choosing among a variety of options (weapons, targets, timing), including use of nuclear weapons to counter a conventional attack. This has been declared U.S. and NATO policy since 1965.
5. NuclearÊArmsÊRace
In the early 1970s, the United States decided to deploy MIRVs on its long-range ballistic missiles.
₯ Describe two important technological developments that made this deployment possible. [12 points]
Technological developments that made possible deployment of MIRVs include (1) development of rockets able to place heavier payloads in earth orbit, (2) development of smaller and more accurate guidance systems that could fit inside a post-boost vehicle (PBV), and (3) development of PBVs to launch several satellites with a single rocket.
₯ What was the sequence of rationales used to justify the decision? Why did the rationale evolve? [12 points]
First justified as a penetration aid to defeat the crude Soviet ABM system being deployed around Moscow; dropped when ABMs were banned by the ABMT. Next justified as a bargaining chip to get the Soviets to negotiate seriously about banning MIRVs; dropped when Soviet began to seriously discuss banning MIRVs in the SALT I talks. Finally justified because the U.S. had a (temporary) technological lead.
₯ Name two important institutions or special interest groups that benefited from the decision in the short run? How did they benefit? [12 points]
Institutions or groups that benefited included (1) the Air Force, which got a new long-range nuclear weapon program and a commitment to a policy of counterforce and war-fighting weapons for the future; (2) the nuclear weapons laboratories, which got to design, develop, and test a whole series of new nuclear warheads; (3) the nuclear weapons industry, which got the money to build many new and more expensive nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
₯ Describe three important ways that this decision reduced U.S. security in the long run. [12 points]
This decision was disastrous for U.S. security in the long run. Important negative effects include (1) the acceleration of the arms race that followed the creation of thousands of new and "lucrative" targets and the perceived need to develop, test, and deploy new, mobile ICBMs in order to counter the theoretical vulnerability of silo-based ICBMs; (2) increased crisis instability caused by the fact that both sides now had strong theoretical incentives to strike first; (3) major new impediments to arms limits or reductions caused by the decision to build large numbers of new, more accurate, and more powerful weapons, by the perceived need to develop, test, and deploy mobile ICBMs, and by the verification difficulties created by the deployment of mobile missiles.
6. RestrictionsÊonÊNuclearÊTesting
Three negotiated agreements restricting nuclear testing are listed below.
₯ Give the year the agreement was signed
₯ Name (or, if there are many, briefly describe) the parties to each agreement
₯ Identify the key parts of the agreement if there is more than one
₯ Describe briefly the key provisions of each part
₯ Describe the most important monitoring method for each agreement
Limited Test Ban Treaty [16 points]
₯ Signed August 5, 1963; went into effect October 10, 1983.
₯ U.S., U.K., and S.U. were original signatories; 112 nations have since signed; China and France have not.
₯ Prohibited testing of nuclear weapons in space, underwater, and in the atmosphere; of unlimited duration (with usual escape clause).
₯ Air-sampling of radionuclides/satellite detection of double optical flash (either is acceptable).
Threshold Test Ban Treaty [16 points]
₯ Signed July 3, 1974 by the U.S. and S.U.; never went into effect because the U.S. failed to ratify it.
₯ Limited underground nuclear tests to yields no greater than 150 kt after March 1976. The parties agreed that one or two slight, unintended breaches per year would be a cause for concern but would not be considered a violation of the Treaty. A Protocol details data that would have been exchanged to asist verification and restricts testing to designated test sites (DTS).
₯ Seismic monitoring of explosion-induced ground motions.
Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty [16 points]
₯ Signed May 28, 1976 by the U.S. and S.U.; never went into effect because the U.S. failed to ratify it. Both parties made political commitments not to undercut the Treaty.
₯ Limited underground nuclear explosions outside DTSs to planned yields no greater than 150 kt after March 1976; limited the planned aggregate yield of multiple explosions to no more than 1500 kt. A Joint Consultative Commisssion would have discussed any compliance questions. A detailed Protocol specifies monitoring procedures, including advance notification and on-site hydrodynamic monitoring for multiple explosions with large aggregate yields.
₯ Seismic monitoring of explosion-induced ground motions.
7. Proliferation
Name the nations that openly possess nuclear weapons and give the year in which each first exploded a nuclear device. [10 points]
United States (1945), Soviet Union (1949), Great Britain (1952), France (1960), People's Republic of China (1964).
Which other nations are believed to have nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon capability even though they do not admit having nuclear weapon programs? [8 points]
India, Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa.
Which South American nations are thought to be actively pursuing nuclear weapons programs? [6 points]
Argentina and Brazil.
Give short definitions of the following terms: [24 points]
₯ Horizontal proliferationÑSpread of nuclear weapons to formerly non-nuclear-weapon states.
₯ Vertical proliferationÑIncrease in the numbers of nuclear weapons and further development of nuclear weapon technology by states already possessing nuclear weapons.
₯ EnrichmentÑPhysical processing of fissionable material by means such as gaseous diffusion, centrifugal separation, and laser separation, to increase the fraction of the material that is fissile. An example is enrichment of natural uranium (mostly U-238) to increase the fraction of nuclei in it that are fissile (U-235).
₯ ReprocessingÑChemical processing of fissionable material to separate desired nuclides from undesired nuclides. An example is processing of partially-used reactor fuel to separate Pu-239 from the fuel, for use in making nuclear weapons.
8. Non-ProliferationÊTreatyÊ(NPT)
The NPT divides the signatories of the treaty into two categories: the so-called nuclear-weapon states and the so-called non-nuclear-weapon states.
What are the principal restrictions the NPT places on the actions and activities of the non-nuclear-weapon states? [14 points]
NNWS must not receive nuclear weapons or control over nuclear weapons directly, or indirectly.
NNWS must not manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons; and must not seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
NNWS must accept IAEA safeguards.
What are the principal restrictions the NPT places on the actions and activities of the nuclear-weapon states? [14 points]
NWS must not transfer nuclear weapons or control over nuclear weapons to any NNWS directly, or indirectly.
NWS must not assist, encourage, or induce any NNWS to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or control over nuclear weapons.
What are the main obligations the NPT imposes on the nuclear-weapon states? [14 points]
Each party agrees to help NNWS with peaceful uses of nuclear explosives.
Each party agrees to cease the nuclear arms race and to undertake nuclear disarmament.
Under the terms of the NPT, review conferences are held every five years. What has been the major complaint of the non-nuclear-weapon states at these conferences? [6 points]
The main complaint of the NNWS states has been that the NWS have not ceased the nuclear arms race let alone undertaken nuclear disarmament as specified in Article VI.
9. Anti-BallisticÊMissileÊTreatyÊ(ABMT)
When was the ABMT signed, by whom was it signed, and what is its duration? [6 points]
The ABMT was signed and ratified by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972, and is of indefinite duration.
What ABM weapon deployments are permitted under the terms of the ABMT (as amended by the 1974 Protocol)? [6 points]
One system, in a deployment area having a radius of 150 km and either centered on the national capital or containing ICBM silo launchers, consisting of no more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 ABM missiles at launch sites, and a very limited number of ABM radars.
The U.S. has charged that the Soviet Union has violated the ABMT by building a large phased-array radar at Abalakova. The Soviet Union has charged that the U.S. has violated the ABMT by building the Thule, Fylingdales, and PAVE PAWS large phased-array radars. Explain the nature and significance of these alleged violations. [18 points]
The ABMT permits construction of early-warning radars only at the periphery of the national territory and only if oriented outward. With these restrictions, such large radars can be destroyed by direct attack and are poorly oriented to assist ABM weapons in intercepting attacking RVs. For these reasons, such radars can contribute little to a nationwide ABM system. Any attempt to construct other large radars with locations and orientations suitable for ABM battle management requires many years and would be easily detected by NTM. With a ban on such radars, complettion of a nationwide ABM system following abrogation of the ABMT would require many years, allowing the other party ample opportunity to take compensating actions.
The radar under construction at Abalakova 'looks like' other Soviet radars that are used for early warning and appears to fill in a gap in Soviet early-warning radar coverage. However, it is located far inside the boundary of the Soviet Union. The U.S. has therefore charged that this radar is a violation of the ABMT. The Soviet Union claims that the Abalakova radar is a spacetrack radar, which is permitted anywhere by the ABMT, and that the U.S. will realize this once it is turned on.
Although radars optimized for spacetrack have different technical characteristics from those optimized for early warning, the ABMT provides no definition of either. Thus, this disagreement is of the type that the Standing Consultative Commission was designed to resolve. Unfortunately, the Reagan Administration made the charge of violation publicly before taking its concerns to the SCC, and has reportedly rejected a variety of suggestions for resolving this dispute made both by its own representative to the SCC and by the Soviet Union. Because of the controversy surrounding it, the Soviet Union suspended construction in the fall of 1987.
By itself, the radar at Abalakova presents no threat to the deterrent capability of the United States. If completed, it will operate at VHF frequencies and therefore has poor resolution for tracking RVs and can be easily blinded by high-altitude nuclear explosions. It is also a large target that is not hardened or defended; it can therefore be destroyed easily by direct attack, a fact that was publicly confirmed last September when a delegation of Congressmen and defense aides visited the construction site and took more than 1,000 photographs and several hours of video tapes. Finally, it is poorly positioned to provide the information needed to defend the nearby Soviet ICBM fields. Thus, the Abalakova radar is most important for the doubt it casts on Soviet willingness to take care that arms control agreements be faithfully followed and to coopearte with the U.S. in resolving differences over treaty interpretation, and the impediment to further progress in U.S.-Soviet arms control that this doubt creates.
The U.S. has constructed a large phased-array radar at Thule, Greenland, and is constructing one at Fylingdales Moor, U.K., radars that it acknowledges are for early-warning. Since Greenland and the U.K. are not U.S. national territory, these radars are violate the ABMT. Originally, the U.S. agreed with this interpretation since beginning construction the U.S. has argued that these radars are exempt from the ABMT. The U.S. has and is continuing to construct a series of large early warning radars along the U.S. coastline, called PAVE PAWS. All but one of these radars are located near the coast, but each covers 240‘. Together with the ABM battle management radar in North Dakota, these radars provide coverage of much of the continental United States.
These radars do not pose a significant threat to the deterrent capability of the Soviet Union, although both the Fylingdales and PAVE PAWS radars have some battle management ccapabilitie. Rather, U.S. construction of these radars is most important for the doubt it casts on U.S. willingness to take care that arms control agreements be faithfully followed and to cooperate with the Soviet Union in resolving differences over treaty interpretation, and the impediment to further progress in U.S.-Soviet arms control that this doubt creates.
What is the basic difference between the "traditional" and "revised" interpretations of the ABMT, who advanced these interpretations, and when? Which is the current official U.S. interpretation of the ABMT? [18 points]
According to the 'traditional' interpretation, neither party can develop, test, or deploy space-based ABM systems of any kind. According to the 'revised' interpretation, the Treaty places no restrictions on development or testing of space-based ABM systems utilizing particle-beam or laser technologies.
The 'traditional' interpretation was advanced by the Nixon Administration to the U.S. Senate during the Treaty ratification hearings, with the concurrence of Soviet observers present at the hearings, and was the interpretation consistently adopted by the U.S. and Soviet governments until October 1985.
In October 1985, the Reagan Administration advanced the 'revised' interpretation with the claim that it is legal. However, due to a firestorm of protest by U.S. allies, arms control experts, and the Congress, the Administration decided to continue adhering to the 'traditional' interpretation for the time being. Thus, the interpretation that the U.S. is supposedly currently following is the 'traditional' interpretation. However, some completed and some planned tests in the SDI program contravene provisions of the ABMT, according to independent experts. Furthermore, the U.S. is insisting, in the Strategic and Space Talks with the Soviet Union currently underway in Geneva, on an interpretation of the ABMT that weakens it even more than the "revised" interpretation. This insistence is currently the main stumbling block to completing a treating reducing the number of long-range nuclear missiles by 50%. If the revised or more recent interpretations by the Reagan Administration are allowed to stand, the ABMT will be gutted.
10. CriteriaÊforÊEvaluatingÊNuclearÊWeapons
Give a brief explanation of what is meant by each of the following criteria for evaluating weapon systems. For each criterion, cite a specific past, present, or proposed weapon system and its effect. [8 points each]
₯ Effect on primary deterrenceÑHow will deploying the weapon system affect the likelihood of a direct, nuclear attack by the adversary on the deploying country? [Cite and assess a weapon system.]
₯ Effect on extended deterrenceÑHow will deploying the weapon system affect the likelihood of a non-nuclear attack by the adversary on the deploying country, or a nuclear or non-nuclear attack on that country's allies? [Cite and assess a weapon system.]
₯ Effect on crisis stabilityÑHow will deploying the weapon system affect the incentive for the adversary to attack the deploying country first in a crisis? [Cite and assess a weapon system.]
₯ Effect on arms race stabilityÑHow will deploying the weapon system affect the incentive for the adversary to deploy more weapons and/or countermeasures, and for the deploying country to deploy still more weapons and counter-countermeasures in turn? [Cite and assess a weapon system.]
₯ Economic costsÑThe direct costs, defined as the resources (money, manpower, and matriel) that must be spent to design, develop, test, deploy, and maintain the weapon system, plus the indirect costs, including opportunity costs, absorption of trained manpower and capital, the decrease in industrial competitiveness, and other negative economic effects. [Cite and assess a weapon system.]
₯ Effect on arms controlÑHow will deploying the weapon system affect the prospects for ongoing or future arms control negotiations? Weapon testing or deployment can, for example, make ongoing negotiations on testing limitations no longer relevant, assessing the relative balance of forces troublesome, monitoring of compliance with future agreements more difficult, and further negotiations politically impossible if they violate previous agreements. [Cite and assess a weapon system.]
11. SDI
What is meant by a "layered" ABM weapon system? [6 points]
An ABM system in which the missiles and/or warheads are attacked by different subsystems in different phases of the ballistic missile flight trajectory. Currently discussed space-based systems would have boost-phase, midcourse, and terminal layers.
Give an example of a proposed directed-energy weapon (DEW) and the phase(s) of ballistic missile flight during which it could in principle be used to attack such missiles. [8 points]
Proposed DEWs include visible-light (e.g., free-electron) ground-based lasers and infrared (e.g., chemical) space-based lasers that could in principle attack missiles during the boost phase and neutral-particle-beam weapons that could in principle attack RVs during the midcourse phase.
Give an example of a proposed kinetic-energy weapon (KEW) and the phase(s) of ballistic missile flight during which it could in principle be used to attack such missiles. [8 points]
Proposed KEWs include space-based homing rockets that could in principle attack missiles during the boost and mid-course phases and ground-based (endoatmospheric or exoatmospheric) homing rockets that could in principle attack RVs during the terminal phase.
Name one active and one passive possible countermeasure against a space-based ABM weapon system. [8 points]
Possible active (and highly effective) countermeasures include placing space mines near the small number of sensing satellites that are the 'eyes' of the ABM weapon system and exploding them just before or during an attack, thereby blinding the entire system; building large numbers of additional ICBMs, to flood and therefore defeat, the system; replacing current boosters with fast-burn boosters, which are invulnerable to most space-based weapons and must be attacked within such a brief interval by those weapons that are effective against boosters at low altitudes that the system cannot cope with the attack; attacking space-based sensors and battle stations with ground- or space-based DEWs or KEWs during the opening phases of an attack, thereby destroying the ABM system; etc.
Possible passive countermeasures include deploying many cheap but fake ICBMs that could be launched at the same time as the real ICBMs, thus presenting the boost-phase layer of the ABM with numerous decoy exhaust plumes; flooding the midcourse phase with hundreds of thousands of decoy RVs, thereby presenting the ABM system with the difficult problem of determining which are real RVs and which are decoys, etc.
What are the so-called "Nitze criteria" and why are they important? [18 points]
An unstated but clearly tacitly assumed zeroth criterion is that an ABM system must be technically effective, that is, it must be able to destroy a sufficiently large fraction of the adversary's ballistic missile RVs in flight trajectory to be militarily useful.
The first explicitly stated criterion is that an ABM system must be invulnerable to attack. Otherwise the system will be enormously crisis-destabilizing, since it can be defeated if the adversary attacks first, providing a large incentive to attack in a crisis. If both sides have an ABM system, this criterion becomes even more important, since such systems will in any case generally be more effective against a ragged retaliation than against a coordinated first strike.
The second explicitly stated criterion is that an ABM system must be 'cost effective at the margin', meaning that the least expensive means of increasing offensive capability must cost more than the least expensive means of enhancing the ABM system to counter it. Otherwise the system will be arms-race-destabilizing, since the side seeking to counter the defense has a great incentive to do so by increasing its offensive capability. Moreover, the defense is likely to lose the resulting action-reaction spiral (by going broke, if nothing else), since re-establishing the same balance between offense and defense balance at the higher level of armaments will cost the defense more than the offense.
These criteria are important not only because they are sensible, but also because the State Department succeeded in getting them adopted as official Reagan Administration policy.
12. IntermediateÊNuclearÊForcesÊTreatyÊ(INFT)
When was the INFT signed and by whom? If ratified, what will be its duration? [4 points]
The INFT was signed December 9, 1987, by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. If ratified, it will be of unlimited duration.
Name the four parts of the INFT. [8 points]
₯ The Treaty
₯ Protocol on Elimination of INF
₯ Protocol on Verification
₯ Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) containing photgraphs of the delivery systems covered by the Treaty, a list of INF facilities covered by the Treaty, and maps of the facilities.
What are the ranges (in km) of the missiles that would be eliminated by the INFT? What is the total number of missiles that would have to be destroyed by each party? [8 points]
The INFT covers shorter-range missiles (SRMs), defined as missiles with ranges between 500 km and 1000 km, and intermediate-range missiles (IRMs), defined as missiles with ranges between 1000 and 5500 km. The Soviet Union will have to destroy 1836 missiles while the U.S. will have to destroy 859 misiles.
Indicate which of the following hardware or activities would be allowed (A) or not allowed (NA) under the INFT: [8 points]
₯ INF launchersÑNA
₯ INF operating basesÑNA
₯ Flight-testing of INF missilesÑNA
₯ Production of INF missilesÑNA
Indicate by yes (Y) or no (N) which of the following rules or activities are part of the INFT verification provisions: [12 points]
₯ Scheduled on-site inspections of Soviet and U.S. INF bases in EuropeÑY
₯ Scheduled on-site inspections of INF bases in the Soviet UnionÑY
₯ Short-notice "challenge" inspections of INF basesÑY
₯ Prohibition against interference with NTMÑY
₯ Monitoring of all missile-production facilities in the U.S. and Soviet UnionÑN
₯ Destruction of INF missiles only at specified elimination sitesÑY
Name two of the four issues raised by the U.S. Senate during the ratification process. Have either of these two issues been resolved? [8 points]
The four issues raised by the U.S. Senate are as follows:
₯ The absence of explicit language in the Treaty banning exotic weapons (lasers carried by cruise missiles, for example). This ambiguity was noted during ratification hearings. In response to this concern, the U.S. asked for, and the Soviet Union furnished (in Russian), a letter of understanding that was drafted for the purpose of resolving this ambiguity. However, the Senate noted significant differences between the translations into English offered by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Thus, a formal memorandum of understanding clarifying the terms of the treaty was requested by the Senate. [Now resolved]
₯ The Senate Intelligence Committee became concerned about the ability of current U.S. NTM to monitor fully certain provisions of the treaty. This led the Committee to request that the President ask for money for these NTMs. After appearing to agree, the White House was recently found to be doing nothing, which caused Committee leaders to become angry. [Now resolved]
₯ During lower-level technical discussions on implementation of the treaty between representatives of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the Soviets appeared to be backing away from certain provisions the U.S. had thought were agreed last December (for example, that the U.S. verification personnel could inspect any buildings at a declared INF facility, inspect all containers large enough to hold SS-20 booster stages, and use cameras without restrictions). When these disagreements came to the attention of the Senate, members expressed deep concern. [Now resolved]
₯ The Senate is concern that this or (more likely) a later President might "re-interpret" the INFT without regard to the interpretation presented in the ratification hearings and without regard to the established practice of the two parties, as Reagan has re-interpreted the ABMT, without the advice and consent of the Senate or the agreement of the Soviet Union. The President has refused to pledge that the Treaty will not be re-interpreted, so it is likely that the Senate will attach a provision banning such unilateral re-interpretation, although debate over this provision may delay a Senate decision advising ratification. Such a provision would not affect the treaty provisions and therefore would not require re-opening negotiations with the Soviets. If such a provision is attached, President Reagan will presumably proceed with ratification rather than junk the treaty. [Not yet resolved]
Phys/STS 180 Final Examination 1988
Page of 14 pages
F. K. Lamb May 19, 1988
Page of 14 pages
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