þ4��t"Û�Û�
Ð�Þ�Þ�Þ��ö�p�f�â�H�H��X�X��r³�|�=à/Ð p�ÐR���Àd�PHYS/STS 180 FINAL EXAMINATION WITH ANSWERS
Name _________________________________________
RETURN OF MATERIALS
Check one option:
[ ] I will pick up my final exam and term paper on or after Monday, May 26, in Room 437 of Loomis Laboratory of Physics.
[ ] Please mail my final exam and term paper to the following address:
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXAM
₯ This is a closed book examination of three hours duration.
₯ Answer 12 and only 12 of the 14 questions. All count equally.
₯ Write your answers in the space provided on these pages. If you need more room, write on the back of the page. Do not write on or submit any other pages.
₯ Put an "X" in the score table below next to the two questions that you do not want graded. Otherwise we will assume you want us to grade the first 12 questions.
SCORES
1. ___48___ 8. ___48___
2. ___48___ 9. ___48___
3. ___48___ 10. ___48___
4. ___48___ 11. ___48___
5. ___48___ 12. ___48___
6. ___48___ 13. ___48___
7. ___48___ 14. ___48___
TOTAL POSSIBLE SCORE ____576___
1. ThermonuclearÊWeapons
a) Shown here is a schematic diagram of a standard thermonuclear weapon. Indicate on the diagram the locations of the following key components:
₯ 6LiD fusion packet
₯ U-238 case
₯ Fission trigger
₯ Tampers
₯ Styrofoam and reflectors
[13 points]
b) Describe briefly the roles of each of these five components. [35 points]
6LiD fusion packet: The thermonuclear 'fuel' of the weapon. When exposed to neutrons, the 6Li acts as a 'catalyst', providing more neutrons and and tritium to fuse with the deuterium (D), releasing energy.
U-238 case: Has two purposes: holds the weapon together, increasing the yield of the fusion packet; fissions when exposed to the intense neutron flux from the fusion reactions, adding to the fission yield of the weapon.
Fission trigger: Provides the X- and g-rays that compress and heat the fusion packet, causing the thermonuclear reaction to go.
Tampers: Inside trigger, slows disasembly of fisile material. Between trigger and fusion packet, slows propagation of debris and shock wave from the fission trigger into the fusion packet, allowing time for the fusion reaction before the fusion packet is disrupted.
Styrofoam and reflectors: Styrofoam holds the fusion packet in place and, when exposed to the X- and g-rays from the fission trigger, creates a high-pressure plasma that helps to compress the fusion packet. Reflectors direct X- and g-rays onto the surface of the fusion packet.
2. Weapon Effects
Thermal radiation [12 points]
₯ What acute thermal exposure (fluence) is sufficient to ignite clothing (such as blue jeans)?
20 cal cm-2
At what distance from a 1 Mt low-altitude airburst would this fluence occur on a dry, clear day?
8 km (5 miles)
₯ What acute thermal exposure (fluence) is sufficient to cause third degree burns to exposed human skin?
8 cal cm-2
At what distance from a 1 Mt low-altitude airburst would this fluence occur on a dry, clear day?
11 km (7 miles)
Ionizing radiation [36 points]. Give short definitions of the following terms:
₯ acute exposure In this context, exposure lasting less than 24 hours.
₯ chronic exposure In this context, exposure lasting more than 24 hours.
₯ residual nuclear radiation Ionizing radiation released by a nuclear weapon from 1 minute after the explosion onwards, often called 'fallout'.
₯ rad Exposure to radiation that deposits 100 ergs of energy in each gram of the target. Applies to all types of radiation and all types of absorbers.
₯ relative biological effectiveness (RBE) Factor that converts the physical dose in rads to biological dose in rems. Depends on the type and energy of the radiatiaon, the type of tissue, and the particular effect(s) of interest
₯ LD50 The acute radiation dose that, if received by an individual, has a 50% probability of causing death or, if received by a given population, will cause death to 50% of the individuals in the population. Estimated to be 450 rem.
3. Key Technological Developments in the Nuclear Arms Race
Six key technological steps in the nuclear arms race are listed below. Give
₯ the approximate date that the United States first took the step
₯ the approximate date that the Soviet Union first took the step
[Dates within a year of the actual dates are adequate. 8 points each.]
Deployment of sizable numbers of SLBMs
U.S. 1960, S.U. 1968
Test of an anti-satellite weapon
U.S. 1964, S.U. 1968
Deployment of sizable numbers of MIRVed missiles
U.S. 1970, S.U. 1974
Test of an ICBM over full range
S.U. 1957, U.S. 1958
Test of a true thermonuclear weapon
U.S. tested a true thermonuclear device in 1952 and several deliverable weapon designs in 1954 [full credit given for either answer].
S.U. tested a true thermonuclear device in 1955.
Deployment of sizable numbers of ICBMs
U.S. 1960, S.U. 1965.
4. Nuclear Policies
Give short (one or two sentence) definitions of each of the following nuclear policies and give the approximate time interval, if any, during which it was declared U.S. policy (you may specify the interval by giving a range of years or presidential administrations).
₯ nuclear war fighting A policy of emphasizing the ability to launch attacks quickly on the leadership and nuclear forces of an adversary and, if necessary, to continue attacks for days, weeks, or months. Major elements of this policy that are usually cited include 'flexibility', 'escalation control', 'endurance of forces and communications', a 'large menu of pre-programed targets', and 'maintenance of reserve forces'. This has been declared U.S. policy since 1974, but has received increased emphasis in recent years.
₯ assured destruction A policy of deploying secure retaliatory strategic forces of sufficient size to cause unacceptable damage to any adversary, even after absorbing a first strike. Here the emphasis is on the security of the forces and their sufficiency for deterrence. This was declared U.S. strategic policy during 1963Ð1973.
₯ first use A policy of attacking with nuclear weapons first, if one is losing a conventional war. This has been declared U.S. and NATO policy since the early 1950's. This wording was introduced to avoid having to use the politically unpalatable term 'first strike' to describe NATO nuclear policy.
₯ massive retaliation A policy of responding to even a small-scale conventional attack on oneself or one's allies with an all-out nuclear attack on the adversary. This was declared U.S. strategic policy during 1954Ð1962.
₯ minimum deterrence A policy of deterring nuclear attack by deploying only enough nuclear forces to be able to destroy an appreciable fraction of the population and industry of any attacker. The emphasis of this policy is on avoiding an arms race while still deterring nuclear attack. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara reportedly considered 400 deliverable EMTs sufficient to deter the Soviet Union from attacking the U.S. This has never been U.S. policy.
₯ flexible response A policy of responding to any attack by choosing among a variety of options (weapons, targets, timing), including use of nuclear weapons to counter a conventional attack. This has been declared U.S. and NATO policy since 1965.
5. Acronyms
Translate the following acronyms:
₯ ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
₯ SALT strategic arms limitation talks
₯ MIRV multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle
₯ ASBM air-to-surface ballistic missile
₯ SCC Standing Consultative Commission
₯ KKV kinetic-kill vehicle
₯ GPS Global Positioning System
₯ SDI Strategic Defense Initiative
₯ SLCM sea-launched cruise missile
₯ START strategic arms reduction talks
₯ SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
₯ ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
₯ GLCM ground-launched cruise missile
₯ ASAT anti-satellite weapon
₯ C3I communication, command, control, and intelligence
₯ SNDV strategic nuclear delivery vehicle
₯ EMP electromagnetic pulse
₯ SIOP single, integrated operational plan
₯ PBV post-boost vehicle
₯ EMT equivalent megatons
₯ SAC Strategic Air Command
₯ NSC National Security Council
₯ IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
₯ CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
6. SALT II and TTBT/PNET
Two key nuclear arms control agreements are listed below.
₯Give the year the agreement was signed
₯Name the parties to each agreement
₯Identify the key parts of the agreement if there are several
₯Describe briefly the key provisions of each agreement
SALT II Accords [24 points]
₯ Signed [but not ratified] by the U.S. and S.U. in 1979.
₯ The SALT II Accords consisted of
(1) A treaty limiting the number of SNDVs to 2250, the number of MIRVed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers with long-range cruise missiles to 1320, the number of launchers of MIRVed ballistic missiles 1200, and the number of launchers of MIRVed ICBMs 820. The treaty would have lasted until 1985.
(2) A protocol banning testing and deployment of ground- and sea-launched long range cruise missiles, mobile ICBMs, and ASBMs (air-to-surface ballistic missiles). The protocol would have expired December 31, 1981.
(3) A joint statement of principles to guide the SALT III negotiations, calling for significant and substantial reductions in strategic offesnive arms and permament resolution of issues temporarily addressed by the protocol.
Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties [24 points]
₯ The TTBT was signed [but not ratified] by the U.S. and S.U. in 1974; the PNET, in 1976.
₯ The TTBT would have banned underground nuclear tests with yields greater than 150 kt after March 1976. The two sides agreed that one or two slight, unintended breaches per year would be a cause for concern but would not be considered a violation of the Treaty. A Protocol details technical data to be exchanged for the purpose of calibrating NTM and restricts testing to designated test sites.
₯ The PNET would have governed all nuclear explosions outside the test sites designated in accordance with the TTBT. It would have banned any such explosions for 'peaceful' purposes (construction of storage cavities and canals, extinguishing oil-well fires, etc.) with planned yields greater than 150 kt. Permitted salvos with planned aggreagate yields up to 1500 kt. In case of salvos, PNET would have provided for advance notification and on-site monitoring. A detailed Protocol set forth monitoring procedures in great detail. The Treaty provided for a Joint Consultative Commission to discuss any questions of compliance.
₯ Although the U.S. has not ratified the treaties, both sides have agreed to abide by their yield limitations.
7. Proliferation
Name the nations that openly possess nuclear weapons and give the year in which each first exploded a nuclear device. [10 points]
United States (1945), Soviet Union (1949), Great Britain (1952), France (1960), People's Republic of China (1964).
Which other nations are believed to have nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon capability even though they do not admit having nuclear weapon programs? [8 points]
India, Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa.
Which South American nations are thought to be actively pursuing nuclear weapons programs? [6 points]
Argentina and Brazil.
Give short definitions of the following terms: [24 points]
₯ horizontal proliferation Spread of nuclear weapons to formerly non-nuclear-weapon states.
₯ vertical proliferation Increase in the numbers of nuclear weapons and further development of nuclear weapon technology by the states openly possessing nuclear weapons.
₯ enrichment Physical processing of fissionable material by means such as gaseous diffusion, centrifugal separation, and laser separation, to increase the fraction of the material that is fissile. An example is enrichment of natural uranium (mostly U-238) to increase the fraction of nuclei in it that are fissile (U-235).
₯ reprocessing Chemical processing of fissionable material to separate desired nuclides from undesired nuclides. An example is processing of partially-used reactor fuel to separate Pu-239 from the fuel, for use in making nuclear weapons.
8. Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
The NPT divides the signatories of the treaty into two categories: the so-called nuclear-weapon states and the so-called non-nuclear-weapon states.
What are the major restrictions placed on the non-nuclear-weapon states by the NPT?
NNWS must not receive nuclear weapons or control over nuclear weapons directly, or indirectly.
NNWS must not manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons; and must not seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
NNWS must accept IAEA safeguards.
What are the major restrictions on the nuclear-weapon states under the NPT?
NWS must not transfer nuclear weapons or control over nuclear weapons to any NNWS directly, or indirectly.
NWS must not assist, encourage, or induce any NNWS to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or control over nuclear weapons.
What are the major obligations of the nuclear-weapon states under the NPT?
Each party agrees to help NNWS with peaceful uses of nuclear explosives.
Each party agrees to cease the nuclear arms race and to undertake nuclear disarmament.
Under the terms of the NPT, review conferences have been held every five years. What has been the major complaint of the non-nuclear-weapon states at these conferences?
The main complaint of the NNWS states has been that the NWS have not ceased the nuclear arms race let alone undertaken nuclear disarmament as specified in Article VI.
9. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT)
When was the ABMT signed, by whom was it signed, and what is its duration? [6 points]
The ABMT was signed [and ratified] by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972, and is of indefinite duration.
What ABM weapon deployments are permitted under the terms of the ABMT (as amended by the 1974 Protocol)? [14 points]
One system, in a deployment area having a radius of 150 km and either centered on the national capital or containing ICBM silo launchers, consisting of no more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 ABM missiles at launch sites, and a very limited number of ABM radars.
What is the basic difference between the 'traditional' and 'revised' interpretations of the ABMT, who advanced these interpretations, and when? Which is the current offical U.S. interpretation of the ABMT? [14 points]
According to the 'traditional' interpretation, neither party can develop, test, or deploy space-based ABM systems of any kind. According to the 'revised' interpretation, the Treaty places no restrictions on development or testing of space-based ABM systems utilizing particle-beam or laser technologies.
The 'traditional' interpretation was advanced by the Nixon Administration to the U.S. Senate during the Treaty ratification hearings, with the concurrence of Soviet observers present at the hearings, and was the interpretation consistently adopted by the U.S. and Soviet governments until October 1985.
In October 1985, the Reagan Administration advanced the 'revised' interpretation with the claim that it is legal. However, due to a firestorm of protest by U.S. allies, arms control experts, and the Congress the Administration decided to continue adhering to the 'traditional' interpretation for the time being. Thus, the interpretation that the U.S. is supposedly currently following is the 'traditional' interpretation.
The U.S. has charged that the Soviet Union has violated the ABMT by building a radar at Abalakova. Explain the nature and significance of this alleged violation. [14 points]
The ABMT permits early-warning radars only at the periphery of the national territory. The purpose of this restriction on radars is primarily to prevent preparations for rapid deployment of a natiowide ABM system following breakout from the ABMT. Construction of such radars is easily observed by NTM and requires many years. Therefore, observations of the construction of a nationwide network of such radars provides 'early warning' of any intent to deploy a nationwide ABM system.
The radar being constructed at Abalakova 'looks like' other Soviet radars that are used for early warning and appears to fill in a gap in Soviet early-warning radar coverage but is located far inside the boundary of the Soviet Union. The U.S. has therefore charged that when this radar is turned on, it will be a violation of the ABMT.
The Soviet Union claims that this will be a spacetrack radar, which is permitted anywhere by the ABMT, and that the U.S. will realize this once it is turned on.
Although radars optimized for spacetrack have different technical characteristics from those optimized for early warning, the ABMT provides no definition of either. Thus, this disagreement is of the type that the Standing Consultative Commission was designed to resolve. Unfortunately, the Reagan Administration made the charge of violation publicly before taking its concerns to the SCC, and has reportedly rejected a variety of suggestions for resolving this dispute made both by its own representative to the SCC and by the Soviet Union.
By itself, the radar at Abalakova presents no military threat to the deterrent capability of the United States. It is a VHF radar and can therefore be easily blinded by high-altitude nuclear explosions. It is also a large, soft target that can easily be destroyed by direct attack. Finally, it is poorly positioned to provide the information needed to defend the nearby Soviet ICBM fields. Thus, the Abalakova radar is most important for the doubt it casts on Soviet willingness to take care that arms control agreements be faithfully followed and the impediment to further progress in U.S.-Soviet arms control that this doubt creates.
10. Treaty Related Questions
To what do the words National Technical Means refer? [6 points]
Methods of monitoring compliance with negotiated arms control agreements generally consistent with the recognized provisions of international law, commonly understood as surveillance by satellite and aerial reconnaissance.
Explain the difference between monitoring of compliance and verification of compliance. [6 points]
Monitoring of compliance is the collection, processing, analysis, and assessment of data on the activities of other parties to an arms control agreement.
Verification of compliance is a political decision by the President, based on the information developed by monitoring activies, as to whether the other parties are complying with the agreement.
What is the Standing Consultative Commission? [6 points]
The SCC is a joint U.S.-Soviet negotiating body originally established by the ABMT that meets semi-annuallly to review implementation of the ABMT and other strategic arms limitations agreements in force.
List three different types of sensors used by the United States to monitor compliance with agreed limitations on nuclear testing under the terms of the Limited Test Ban, Threshold Test Ban, and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. Where is each type of sensor located and what kind of information does each collect? [30 points]
Examples include:
Nuclear burst detectors located in earth orbit to detect optical, X-ray, and g-ray flashes produced by nuclear explosions in the atmosphere or in outer space.
Acoustic sensors located around the earth in the atmosphere to detect the sound waves produced by nuclear explosions in the atmosphere.
Hydrophones located underwater in the oceans around the earth to detect the sound waves produced by nuclear explosions underwater.
A world-wide netork of seismic stations with sensors placed in the ground to detect and measure the motions of the ground produced by nuclear explosions underground.
A world-wide fleet of aircraft equiped with air sampling devices to pick up and measure any airborne radioactivity produced by nuclear explosions in the atmosphere or venting of gases from nuclear tests underground.
11. U.S. and Soviet Force Structure
Which leg of the U.S. strategic triad carries the most warheads? The fewest warheads?
U.S. SLBMs carry the most warheads, U.S. ICBMs the fewest.
Which leg of the Soviet strategic triad carries the most warheads? The least warheads?
S.U. ICBMs carry the most warheads, S.U. SLBMs the fewest.
Consider each of the following quantities sometimes referred to in discussions of nuclear forces. Which nation (the United States or the Soviet Union) currently has more?
₯ strategic nuclear warheads United States
₯ invulnerable strategic nuclear warheads United States
₯ ICBMs Soviet Union
₯ SLBMs on station United States
₯ strategic bombers United States
₯ deliverable throweight Soviet Union
₯ deliverable EMT Soviet Union
₯ invulnerable EMT United States
12. Criteria for Evaluating Weapons
Give a brief explanation of what is meant by each of the following criteria for evaluating weapon systems. For each criterion, cite a specific past, present, or proposed weapon system and assess it.
₯ Effect on primary deterrence How will deploying the weapon system affect the likelihood of a direct, nuclear attack by the adversary on the deploying country? [Cite and assess a weapon system.]
₯ Effect on extended deterrence How will deploying the weapon system affect the likelihood of a non-nuclear attack by the adversary on the deploying country, or a nuclear or non-nuclear attack on that country's allies? [Cite and assess a weapon system.]
₯ Effect on crisis stability How will deploying the weapon system affect the incentive for the adversary to attack the deploying country first in a crisis? [Cite and assess a weapon system.]
₯ Effect on arms race stability How will deploying the weapon system affect the incentive for the adversary to deploy more weapons and/or countermeasures, and for the deploying country to deploy still more weapons and counter-countermeasures in turn? [Cite and assess a weapon system.]
₯ Effect on escalation dominance How will deploying the weapon system affect the balance of nuclear forces of that type with that mission? [Cite and assess a weapon system.]
₯ Direct economic costs The resources (money, manpower, and matriel) that must be spent to design, develop, test, deploy, and maintain the weapon system. [Cite and assess a weapon system.]
₯ Indirect economic costs The opportunity costs, drain on trained manpower and capital, decrease in industrial competitiveness, and other negative economic effects of allocating resources to design, develop, test, deploy, and maintain the weapon system. [Cite and assess a weapon system.]
₯ Effect on possibility of negotiated arms control How will deploying the weapon system affect the prospects for ongoing or future arms control negotiations? Weapon testing or deployment can, for example, make ongoing negotiations on testing limitations no longer relevant, assessing the relative balance of forces troublesome, monitoring of compliance with future agreements more difficult, and further negotiations politically impossible if they violate previous agreements. [Cite and assess a weapon system.]
13. Anti-Satellite Weapons
List the five basic categories of military satellites, explain briefly what each category is used for, and state the type or types of orbit (e.g., low inclined and geosynchronous equatorial) in which each category of satellite is currently being placed [28 points]
Geodetic satellites, in low inclined orbits, measure the gravitational field of the earth and the distance between points on the earth's surface in order, among other things, to make possible accurate delivery of nuclear weapons by ballistic missiles.
Meteorological satellites, mostly in low inclined orbits, observe weather conditions around the globe, in part to allow ICBMs to be frequently updated with weather conditions over their targets, in order to improve their accuracy.
Navigation satellites, now mostly in inclined semi-synchronous orbits, allow soldiers, ships, airplanes, and missiles to determine their locations and velocities with high precision.
Communications satellites, now mostly in equatorial geosynchronous or Molniya orbits, make possible communications between ground stations, airplanes, submarines, ships, missiles, etc.
Surveillance satellites keep watch on activities on the earth, in the atmosphere, and in space. Surveillance satellites in low earth orbit are used for photoreconnaissance and to intercept communications. Satellites in semi-synchronous, Molniya, and geosynchronous orbits are used to monitor nuclear explosions in the atmosphere or in space. Satellites in geosynchronous orbit are used to warn of missile launches and to intercept communications. Satellites in super-synchronous orbits watch for nuclear explosions in deep space.
Explain briefly the following terms: [20 points]
₯ co-orbital intercept Intercept of a target satellite by a weapon, wherein the weapon is launched into an orbit similar to that of the target and gradually moves closer to the target.
₯ MHV Miniature Homing Vehicle, the small 'warhead' on the current U.S. ASAT weapon, which is mounted on a rocket that is launched from an F-15 and which contains infrared sensors, a ring-laser gyroscope for guidance, and many smal rockets for steering.
₯ hardening Designing satellite structures and sensors so that they are better able to withstand attack. Measures could include making the satellites less sensitive to nuclear radiation, irradiation by lasers, destruction by shrapnel, etc.
₯ reconstitution Re-establishing a satellite constellation after the existing constellation has been attacked by launching replacement satellites.
14. SDI
What is meant by a 'layered' ABM system?
An ABM system in which the missiles and/or warheads are attacked by different subsystems in different phases of the ballistic missile flight trajectory. Currently discussed space-based systems would have boost-phase, midcourse, and terminal layers.
Give two examples of proposed directed-energy weapons (DEWs) and the phase(s) of ballistic missile flight during which they could in principle be used to attack such missiles.
Visible-light (e.g., free-electron) lasers could in principle attack missiles during the boost phase. Neutral-particle-beam weapons could in principle attack RVs during the midcourse phase.
Give two examples of proposed kinetic-energy weapons (KEWs) and the phase(s) of ballistic missile flight during which they could in principle be used to attack such missiles.
Space-based homing rockets could in principle attack missiles during the boost and mid-course phases. Ground-based homing rockets could in principle attack RVs during the terminal phase.
Name one active and one passive possible countermeasure against a space-based ABM system.
One active (and highly effective) countermeasure would be to place space mines near the handful of sensing satellites that are the 'eyes' of the ABM weapon system and to explode them just before or during an attack, thereby blinding the entire system.
One passive countermeasure would be to deploy many cheap but fake ICBMs that could be launched at the same time as the real ICBMs, thus presenting the boost-phase layer of the ABM with numerous decoy exhaust plumes.
What are the so-called 'Nitze criteria" and why are they important?
An unstated but clearly tacitly assumed zeroth criterion is that an ABM system must be technically effective, that is, it must be able to destroy a sufficiently large fraction of the adversary's ballistic missile RVs in flight trajectory.
The first explicitly stated criterion is that an ABM system must be invulnerable to attack. Otherwise the system will be enormously crisis-destabilizing, since it can be defeated if the adversary attacks first, providing a large incentive to attack in a crisis. If both sides have an ABM system, this criterion becomes even more important, since such systems will in any case generally be more effective against a ragged retaliation than against a coordinated first strike.
The second explicitly stated criterion is that an ABM system must be 'cost effective at the margin', meaning that the least expensive means of increasing offensive capability must cost more than the least expensive means of enhancing the ABM system to counter it. Otherwise the system will be arms-race-destabilizing, since the side seeking to counter the defense has a great incentive to do so by increasing its offensive capability. Moreover, the defense is likely to lose the resulting action-reaction spiral, since additional defensive costs more than additional offensive.
These criteria are important not only because they are sensible, but also because the State Department succeeded in getting them adopted as official Reagan Administration policy.
Phys/STS 180 Final Examination Solutions 1987
Page of 17 pages
F. K. Lamb June 4, 1987
Page of 17 pages
7A:R�ú�¦Â�ì��¦ÂÜ���É ���ÉwÝwÝwÝwÝ4�:�0�"G8 d�9""m�Z�Zh�Z�Zd�:""m�Zh�Z d�:�"Z�΄�Zh�΄�Zl
Zh
Z �2�C �:�2�:C �"��"�d�?�e�Z�Zh�Z�Zd�@�e�Zh�Z d�@��]�΄�Zh�΄�Zl
Zh
Z ��6�= �@�6�@=4�A�5�?""""T�LUXwÝwÝwÝwÝT�X+�vIX4�Q�þ�z8D((D4�W�0�v�ü8 ��"�bg�"�d:K2‘��‘��ÿü�/� �
(�L
Fusion Packet ™ ‘��‘����- +>Fission
™‘��ÿö�- *
Trigger ™ ‘�‘��ÿü�� (�1Tamper ™ ‘��‘����� +6U-238
™‘��ÿö�� *
Case ™ ‘��‘����3� (��w
Styrofoam and
™‘��ÿö�3� *
Reflectors ™ "�a�ΊJ―#B� ‘ "�I�46Æ# ‘ "�Y,Ó#K� ‘ ÿÑÑÑÑÑ
"" energy of the radiati.
. You may take up toto complete it
6�ÿ�I�Ώ�C��I��
+�,�_�t�����Ώ�Ô� �+�É�ó�S���‘�©ysys�q�s�s�q�o�o�o�q�@��"�"�©�«�Í�Ï�Ú�Ü�þ��
/�1�<�>�`�b�m�o�" Â�Äz�z�z�z�z�z�z�z�z�z�z�z����Ä�Ï�Ñ�ó�õ���"4�Ê�Ë�5�6� ���á�â�z�z�z�x�q�d�q�z]����
P���t$�����â�T�a� 2� D� Z� [� ΄� Ύ�À�Û�
(�
)�
¬�
�
Ù�
Û�
í�
n�
w�
yz�z�zuz�z�zuzuz�s�zl��������
y�
�
í�
Z�
b�
d�
�
Ù�
<�
s�
�
À�
à�T�\ï��Χ�à�Ä�Å��z�zs�z�z�z�z�z�z�z�q�������F�[�Ê�ß���?�Ä�Æ�ö�!�6�?�S�ï�χ�v�m��»�z�z�z�z�z�z�z�x�v�z�z�@���»�È�ê��Ê�à�"�"�--"-‘�-Ë�-ï�-χ�� �T�\~�
�§�®�Ä�Ë�z�z�z�z�x�z�z�z�z�z�z����Ë�æ�í�
� 0� 9� Y� a� � ΄� Ό� Ü� ä� û�!�!�!�!5�!=�!a�!hz�z�z�z�z�z�z�z�s�z�z�����!h�!�!�!¬�!³�!Ç�!Î�!ã�!ê�"�"�"#�"+�"O�"W�"v�"w�""î�"ô�#°�&ú�'Cz�z�z�z�z�z�z�z�x�v�z�@���'C�,�,%�,«�-"-Á�-ë�.V�.k�.Å�/�/"�/΄�/Ã�0û�1
1í�1ð�2�2ý�4�4(�44zx�z�z�z�z�z�z�z�x�z�v�@���44�4b�5V�5k�5v�5€�6E�6ò�7™�77Ä�8-89
9L�9R�9t�9v�9w�99�:z�x�z�z�v�z�zqzq�z�z�@�@���:;�? ?Ύ�H9�H=�HY�Hp�H�HI{I�I΄�IΉ�IÖ�Iâ�K>�KL�Kl�K{LF�MMõ�z�z�x�v�z�v�v�z�v�z�z�@���Mõ�Mö�PÖ�Pù�Q2�Q:�QH�QP�QS�QQÏ�QΧ�Qä�Qì�Qï�R)�Rý�S
S7�SF�SO�S]zus�q�q�u�q�q�u�u�u�u�@�����S]�Sq�SSS€�SΎ�SÌ�Sß�Sí�T�T�T�T6�UUÆ�Uç�VÇ�Vå�W�Wͺ�Xͺ�XÌ�Y[�Yt�z�z�z�z�z�x�z�z�z�z�z����Yt�Z"Z7�[@�[t�]D�]G�]a�]ð�]õ�^o�^w�_l�_z�`T�`^�a
a�aÆ�aÒ�cÜ�d'z�z�z�x�v�qzqzqzqzqz�@�@���d'�dÊ�dÒ�eË�eØ�fΎ�fÐ�gS�gV�g]�g�h�i5�iD�iI�iX�iY�ió�j₯�k`�kΎ�mmÚz�z�z�z�x�z�zsz�z�z�z�@����mÚ�ss sÕ�sÖ�t�t t"t"w-ww �w!�w"�w#�w$�w%�w&�w<�w=�w>�wSz�w�w�q�zzzz��@��@����,�-�.�]�^�_�s�t��`AAAAAAA�-
�8p
¨àP"�-�8p
¨àP"����L�M�� �Ό�½�Ύ�Ώ�Õ�ÖrkdEEEEEEEEE�-
�8p
¨àP"��Ð�
Ð
"þ>
Ö���U�V�ô�õ�™bbbbEbE�"
ÐÿL�
¨àP"�"
ÐÿL�
¨àP"��™���’�£�Ó�Ô���5�6�f�g````A`A`A`A`�-
�8p
¨àP"�-
�8p
¨àP"�
g��È�É�ù�ú�û`A`A`AA�-
�8p
¨àP"-
�8p
¨àP"��û��5`8�'�vý�
v Ø
HΈ-ð�-�8p
¨àP"��5�6�Ç�Ý�ë�þ� %�4�5YOKGGGGGY�
þò%�
vý�
v Ø
HΈ-ð� 5�7�� �U�V� 3� 4Y33/�+��Ô�%�
vý�
v Ø
HΈ-ð�%�èvý�
v Ø
HΈ-ð�� 4� ΅� Ά�Á�Â�
Ú�
í�
î�
l�
z�
{
�
î�
ï�
X�
e�
f{wwwqmmieaieiieai�
���D�
f�
�
Ú�
Û�
+�
,�
t�
u�
v�
w�
Á�
�
�
Ä�U�V�W�ð�ñ�ò{wwswowwwowwwkwwkww�äô
�ò�Ø�Ù�Ú�Å���O{wwsmGG�%�
þò�
@x°è" X��Ä
Ô�O�Ô�""-E�F�\VVV00000�%�
þò�
@x°è" X�(�
þî�
@x°è" X��\]�^���É�Ê�à�á�â�����YYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY%�
þò�
@x°è" X���>�?�Å�Æ�χ�ø�ù� �!�7�8�9�:�;�<�=YYUYYYYYYYYYYYYY��
%�
þò�
@x°è" X��=�>�S�T�_�`�n�o�Ό�½�ë�ìYS�OKGKCKCK�
΄
�
�%�
þò�
@x°è" X�
ì�Ë�Ì�"™�"�-"-"-‘�-’�-Ä�-Å�-ð�-ñ���U�V��¨{wswowi�wewewewewe�
�Ä"
Ô�¨�©�Å�Æ�ç�è�
1� 2� Z� [� � � ΅� Ά� Ý� Þ� ü� ý�!6�!7�!b{w{w{w{w{w{w{w{w{w{s{w�
�!b�!c�!!!�!®�!È�!É�!ä�!å�"�"�"$�"%�"P�"Q�"w�"""Ì�"õ{w{w{w{w{w{w{w{wq�j�
�
�"õ�#�#Y�##"#―�#°�#ë�$xxxtttNN�%�
"ýä�
@x°è" X�
�$�%>�&Y3�%�
"ýä�
@x°è" X�%�
"ýä�
@x°è" X��&�&ú�&û�'B�'CY3//�
%�
þò�
@x°è" X�%�
"ýä�
@x°è" X��'C�')-Y3�%�
"ýä�
@x°è" X�%�
"ýä�
@x°è" X��)-�+₯�,�,&�,'�,ͺ�,«�--Y3-�)�)��
�
%�
"ýä�
@x°è" X�%�
"ýä�
@x°è" X��---- �-À�-Á�-ì�-í�-î�.U�.V�.l�.m�.n�.ͺ�.«�/�/ /�/΅�/Ά�/·�{{wswwoww�äô
�
�/·�0ü�0ý�0þ�1î�1ï�2�2�2§�2¨�2ü�2ý�3\3]�3ð�3ñ�4�4{wwswm�c�_�[��
�
ÐÐ�Ä
΄�4�4�4a�4b�4Í�4Î�5V�5W�5X�5£�5€�5í�5î�6E�6F�6G�6ñ�6ò�7™�7�7�7�{w�{{{w��
�
�7�7�7�8"8-8"8"889
9
: �:!�:"�:#�:ÿ�;�<1�<2�=a�=by�u�u�q�m�i�i��
�
�
�
��=b�?�?
?
?½�?Ύ�A€�A₯�Bö�Bχ�C�C™�EΈ�EΉ�H9�H:�H;�H<{w�s�o�k�g�c��
�
�
�
�
��
�H<�HZ�H[�H�HI|�I}Iá�Iâ�J|�J}K?�K@�Kz�K{LG�LH�M"MM§�M¨y�u�q�m�u�u�u��
�
�
��M¨�NG�NH�NÐ�NÑ�OT�OU�Oû�Oü�PÕ�PÖ�Pú�Pû�QR�QS�QQQQQQ"Q"{w�w�w�smm��
��
�4�Q"QQQî�Qï�R*�R+�R,�R-�R.�R/�R0�R1�R2�R3�Rß�Rà�Rá�S
S
SG�SH�S^�{wwswsws�
�
�S^�S_�SS�S₯�S¦�SÍ�SÎ�Sî�Sï�T�T�T7�T8�U�U�UÇ�UÈ�VÈ�VÉ{w{w{w{w{w{q�m{i{e{ÄÔ�
�
�VÉ�W�W�X«�X¬�Y\Y]�Z"Z-[A�[B�]E�]F�]G�]b�]c�^n�^o{wswow{wkwgwwa�]��
�
΄äÄ
Ô�^o�_k�_l�`S�`T�a
a
aÅ�aÆ�cÜ�cÝ�cÞ�d�d�dË�dÌ�eÌ�eÍ�fΏ�fÀ{w�w�w�s�okogocoÄ�ä
�
�
�
�fÀ�gT�gU�gV�g^�g_�g�g�h�h�i4�i5�iô�iõ�j€�j₯�ka�kb�k½�kΎ{u�q�m�i�m�i�e���
�
�
�
ä�kΎ�lΊ�l»�m"m"mmÙ�mÚ�nÉ�nÊ�p₯�p¦�rê�rë�ss�s sÎ�sÏ{w�w�s�o�w�b^�
�!À@�
�
�
�
�sÏ�sç�sè�t�t�t�t�t"t"w$�w>�wfyueuyuu�uuu����à!À @��
`�ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿnHang,hTitle,tSubtitle,s
Viewgraph,vIndent & Hang,iTextÿEquation,eIndentÿ�!ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ���@�ÿ�&ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ�$��΄ÿL�
@x°è" X$&�à�ð�8p
¨àP-<�&��ð�ð�8p
¨àP"�&��Ð�x�xp8
¨àP"�-�Â$
@x°è" X�-��8p
¨àP"�ÿ�� � �à!À @ Ð�8p
¨àP"��ó�ô�ö�Þ�� �s��t""Ò�½6�"wS�wa�wb�wc�wd�we�wf��s0��t"4�ê�Õ�N�"€�!�+(�1�6°�> �GP�O�S&�\X�cà�jv�s0À�À�À�������@��� ��
�
�
�
�����À��/�H�b�{|��©�Ä�â�
y��»�Ë�!h�'C�44�:Mõ�S]�Yt�d'�mÚ�wS�wf�ï�ð�ñ�ò�ó�ô�õ�ö�χ�ø�ù�ú�û�ü�ý�þ�ÿ)���Ö�™�g�û�5�5� 4�
f�ò�O�\�=�ì�¨�!b�"õ�$�&�'C�)-�--/·�4�7�=b�H<�M¨�Q"S^�VÉ�^o�fÀ�kΎ�sÏ�wf�
""- !"#$��������ù�
�)�―�°�v�w�W�X�Ï�Ð� ë� ì�
Y�
Z�
a�
b�₯�å�æ�!Ý�!Þ�"�"�"-�".�"m�"n�r²�r³�s/�s0����w>��ü��wS��� �w-�� �w�c� �w �� F� �w!�� Ώ� �w"��Ý��w$��K��w%��S��w&���w<��Χ��wa��"Î��wb��"χ��wc��#"�wd��#[� �we� �s �t"