Physics 280: Session 25

Questions

News and discussion

Module 7: Defenses cont’d
JINDO, South Korea — With South Korea preoccupied by a ferry disaster, North Korea has increased activities at its main nuclear test site, prompting Seoul and Washington to prepare for a possible nuclear test from the North, the South Korean Defense Ministry said on Tuesday.

The report came as President Obama was nearing the start of a trip later this week to Japan and South Korea, where he was expected to discuss with regional leaders how to deal with the North Korean nuclear threats.

“We have detected various types of activities at Punggye-ri,” a Defense Ministry spokesman, Kim Min-seok, said on Tuesday, referring to the place in northeastern North Korea where the country has conducted three underground nuclear tests since 2006, with the latest occurring in February 2013.

Mr. Kim said the United States and South Korea had heightened their combined surveillance and intelligence-gathering efforts to prepare for a possible nuclear test from the North. The South Korean military activated a special crisis management task force on Monday morning, he said.

South Korea and international analysts have recently said that satellite imagery showed continuing activities at the North’s nuclear test site, but they reported no signs that a test was imminent. The South Korean Defense Ministry had said that a new nuclear test by North Korea was a “political” rather than technical decision, with its engineers ready to conduct one on relatively short notice from its leader, Kim Jong-un.
Module 8: Nuclear Arms Control
Nature and Goals of Arms Control
Arms Control in the area of chemical warfare

First treaty: the 1925 Geneva Protocol
   bans the use of chemical weapons.

Current: Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
   Entered into force on April 29th 1997, Duration: Indefinite
   Bans use & possession of chemical weapons
   Defines time table for destruction of chemical weapons

Original deadline for destruction of all chemical weapons set in CWC:
April 29th 2012 – Lybia, Russia and US did not reached this goal.

2014 OPCW report: 78% of all declared chemical weapons
have been destroyed (55,539 metric tons)
CWC Signed & Ratified by 190 Countries

Implementation is monitored by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons located at The Hague, Netherlands.

OPCW was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 2013

CWC provided framework to deal with crisis that arose from the use of chemical weapons by the Government of Syria in 2013.

The destruction of the Syrian chemical weapon stockpile is being monitored by the OPCW.
Removal of Syrian Chemicals Passes 86% of Total

Tuesday, 22 April 2014

The Director-General of the OPCW welcomed delivery of a further consignment of chemicals to the port of Latakia by the Syrian government today. The chemicals were immediately boarded onto cargo ships upon arrival at the port and removed from the country.

This raises the overall portion of chemicals removed from Syria to 86.5% of the total, including 88.7 % of all Priority 1 chemicals. Today’s consignment was the 17th to date and the sixth consignment since 4 April, marking a significant acceleration in the pace of deliveries to Latakia this month.

“This latest consignment is encouraging," the Director-General said. “We hope that the remaining two or three consignments are delivered quickly to permit destruction operations to get underway in time to meet the mid-year deadline for destroying Syria’s chemical weapons."
Arms Control is one tool in the toolbox of international relations, which also includes

• Diplomacy
  — Bilateral
  — Multilateral (including the United Nations)

• Other security instruments
  — Political
  — Economic
  — Technological
  — Environmental

• Military Force
  — Self defense

  If all else fails and action is justifiable within legal & ethical considerations
Arms Control is not the antithesis of military power.

• It was often portrayed as that during the Cold War
• It is the same as (partial) disarmament
• It is not the answer to all problems

Arms Control is difficult and imperfect.

• So also is diplomacy and the use of military force
• The right questions to ask are, “Is there a better way? A cheaper way? A more effective way? A less risky way?”
Understanding Arms Control

Unilateral reciprocal steps without treaties are possible but rarely successful in the long run.

Treaties have been more successful.

**Arms control is a multilateral act —**

- Two or more parties (usually states) are involved

- An agreement is possible *only* if all the parties involved see it as in *their* best interests

- If conditions change, interests can change and one or more parties may view an earlier agreement as no longer in their best interest
Goals of Nuclear Arms Control

There are many possible motivations for controlling nuclear arms:

- Eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons including their use in war or in terrorist attacks
- Reduce the cost of a nuclear arms race
- Enhance international security and stability
- Facilitate international cooperation
Most nuclear arms control is about preventing and reversing or, at least, slowing nuclear proliferation, i.e., the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability

- Horizontal proliferation: the spread of NWs to additional states (or non-state actors)

- Vertical proliferation: the increase in the number and/or capability of the NWs of states that already have them

- Vertical and horizontal proliferation are inherently coupled

- The ultimate motivation for pursuing nuclear arms control is that Nuclear Weapons threaten the very existence of individual nations and human civilization.
Overview of Nuclear Arms Control Treaties
Key Nuclear Arms Control Agreements and Year Signed (Important)

- 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)
- 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
- 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) = Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT)
  + Interim Agreement on Offensive Forces
- 1974/1980 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT)
  + Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET)
- 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INFT)
- 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
  + 1992 Lisbon Protocol regarding successor states
- 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), not in force yet
- 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)
- 2011 New START
Other Important Nuclear Arms Control Agreements and Year Signed

- 1959  Antarctic NWFZ Treaty
- 1967  Latin America Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Treaty (Tlatelolco)
- 1968  African NWFZ Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)
- 1970  Outer Space Treaty
- 1971  Seabed Treaty
- 1979  Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II (SALT II), never ratified
- 1985  South Pacific NWFZ Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)
- 1987/1993  Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
- 1994  Agreed Framework between US and DPRK
- 1995  South-East Asian NWFZ Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok)
- 1997  Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II), never ratified
- 2002  International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC)
History of Strategic Nuclear Arms Agreements

- 1972: Nixon — Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT), approved
- 1979: Carter — Second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), withdrawn
- 1991: Reagan & Bush I — Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), approved
- 1992: Bush I — Lisbon Accord, approved
- 1993: Bush I & Clinton — Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II), Ratified in 1996 in Senate, Senate did not ratify 1997 START II addendum Ratification by Russia in 2000 conditional on US ratification of addendum
- 1996: Clinton — Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Senate did not ratify
- 2002: Bush II — Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), approved
- 2010: Obama — New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), approved
Which of the following launch locations is not part of President Obama’s European-based missile defense program?

(A) Poland

(B) Romania

(C) United Kingdom

(D) Sea based
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iClicker Question

How many sea based SM-3 intercepters will be deployed as part of President Obama’s European-based missile defense program by 2018?

(A) 200
(B) 300
(D) 400
(E) more than 500
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(A) 200
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The Nature of Treaties
The Nature of Treaties

- A treaty is a written agreement between two or more sovereign states in which the parties involved agree to abide by certain specified procedures and standards of conduct.

The Nature of Treaties

• **Signature:** Signature by an authorized State representative (*need not be the highest official*).

• **Ratification:** Each of the participating parties go through a domestic “ratification” process that is designed to show that the state agrees to be bound by the treaty, independent of future changes in political leadership.

• **Entry into Force:** The treaty specifies the conditions for its entry into force, typically based on the number of ratifying states.

  Default: Ratification by all negotiating states.
The Nature of Treaties

Member State Status

• During negotiations: Negotiating State

• After signature: State Signatory

• After ratification: Ratifying State

• After entry into Force: State Party
The Nature of Treaties

Obligations prior to entry into force and for withdrawal —

• According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a state that has signed a treaty is bound to it and is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty even if it has not yet ratified the treaty.

• A state can change its mind before ratification. After announcing to the world that it is withdrawing its signature, it is no longer bound.

• After ratification, a state is obligated to announce to the world in advance that it plans to withdraw from a treaty.
  —The treaty specifies the advanced notice required.
  —In arms control treaties this is referred to as the “Supreme National Interest” clause.
Traditionally, treaties are “deposited” at one or more locations (depository) where they may be studied by any interested party.

- It is rare to have “secret” treaties or secret parts of treaties in the arms control context.
- International knowledge and support is usually one of the reasons states enter into treaties.

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties clarifies a wide range of issues associates with treaties of all types:

- Interpretation of language
- Norms of conduct not explicitly prescribed in the treaty
- Traditional practice (common sense) also applies
A written agreement does *not* have to have the word “treaty” in its title to be a treaty

- What is required are the features described above
- The word “Convention” is a common substitute for the word “Treaty” in titles, but taken alone “Convention” does not itself imply the agreement is a treaty
- Examples: Biological Weapons Convention, Chemical Weapons Convention
- The word “Protocol” is used in many different ways in the international context
  - to describe a treaty in itself
  - to describe a part of or an amendment to a treaty
  - to describe something less than a treaty

An “Executive Agreement” is an agreement between the heads of two (or more) states and is not legally binding in the same way as a ratified treaty (for example, future heads of states are not bound by an executive agreement).
A treaty typically has an “official” name and a “familiar” name (a nickname), which often includes the geographical location where it was negotiated or signed.

The number of parties to treaties can vary

- Distinguish “bilateral”, “trilateral” and “multilateral” treaties
- Goal for “universal” treaties

The duration of treaties can vary

- “Indefinite duration” means forever (for all time)
- A treaty can also be for only a specified duration
Nuclear Arms Control During the Cold War
First Success: The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty

• Was agreed by the U.S. and Soviet Union in 1963

• Considerations started in 1954, originally aiming at a comprehensive test ban treaty

• Built on 8 years of work beginning with the Eisenhower administration

• Was negotiated by Averill Harriman, Kennedy’s special ambassador, in face-to-face negotiations with Nikita Khrushchev in only 10 days in July–August 1963


• US, USSR, and UK were the original parties

• Almost all states of the world are now parties to the LTBT
The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty

Provisions —

• A two-page treaty (see the PHYS-280 documents web page)

• Bans “any nuclear weapons test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion” “in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or underwater”

• “in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State...”

• Has no verification provisions: verification is easy using existing surveillance technologies because of the unique signatures of a nuclear explosion
The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty

- Came about largely as a response to world-wide public outcry against fallout from atmospheric testing
- Role of scientists (Nobel Peace Prize Linus Pauling)
- Original goal eliminating all nuclear testing failed because of internal political opposition within the three countries and because of controversy over whether underground tests could be detected (this question was again used by opponents of the CTBT as an excuse not to ratify it in the U.S. Senate)
- Was the first sign of hope for controlling nuclear weapons, but in practice was primarily an environmental protection measure (radioactivity from nuclear testing restricted to the underground
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

- NWFZs are in force on the territory of 110 countries
- Some are single-state NWFZs (Austria, Mongolia)
- In preparation: Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
- Almost the whole southern hemisphere is covered by NWFZs
Other “Nuclear Free Zones”

• 1967 Outer Space Treaty
  — No basing of NWs in orbit about earth
  — Moon and other celestial bodies (planets, asteroids, etc.) nuclear free zones
  — Numerous other restriction on state behavior that are unrelated to nuclear weapons

• 1971 Seabed Treaty
  — No basing, storage, of testing of NW (or other WMD) on seabed, ocean floor, and subsoil thereof
  — Does not apply to coastal waters (12 mile limit)
  — Modeled after Outer Space Treaty
Almost the whole southern hemisphere is covered by Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaties.
Latin American Nuclear Free Zone (LANFZ) Treaty (1967)

- Also known as the “Treaty of Tlatelolco,” the area of Mexico City where the diplomats assembled
- Signed in 1967, is of indefinite duration
- Came about through the efforts of five Latin Presidents (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico)
- Motivation came from the 1962 Cuban missile crisis
- The 24 Latin American signatories agree not to develop or introduce NWs
- The four countries outside of region (US, UK, Neth, Fr) agree in a signed protocol to apply the provisions to their territories in LA
- All five NPT NW states agree in second protocol not to introduce NWs into region of LA
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

• 1959 Antarctic Treaty (first post-WWII treaty)
  — Entire continent a nuclear free zone
  — Numerous other restrictions on state behavior that are unrelated to nuclear weapons

• 1985 South Pacific NWFZ (Treaty of Raratonga)

• 1995 South-East Asian NWFZ (Treaty of Bangkok)

• 1996 African NWFZ (Treaty of Pelindaba)
Horizontal Nuclear Non-Proliferation

1955: Atoms for Peace (see http://www.iaea.org/About/atomsforpeace_speech.html)

1957: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) formed

Verification: Nuclear Safeguards

• The initial safeguards agreement did not provide full-scope safeguards

• Full-scope safeguards came after the 1968 NPT (in the Model Safeguards Agreement of 1971)
Questions

Extra Credit Opportunity C

News and discussion

Module 8: Nuclear Arms Control
Physics 280: Extra Credit Opportunity C

Movie Presentation: “The Gate Keepers”

In the Lucy Ellis Lounge, Room 1080 in the Foreign Languages Building

Vote on possible times:

(A) Monday, April 28 at 6:30 p.m.

(B) Monday, April 28 at 7:00 p.m.

(C) Thursday, May 1 at 7:00 p.m.
News: Does Iran Honor the Joint Plan of Action Negotiated with the P5+1 in November 2013?

Huffington Post, 4-21-2014
The Iran Interim Nuclear Deal Is Three Months Old
-- How Is It Going? What's Next?

Iran's nuclear progress has been halted for three months, and Iran has received some limited relief from sanctions under the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) agreed on November 24, 2013 and implemented on January 20, 2014. Three months after taking effect, all sides report that the agreement is being fairly implemented. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that Iran's stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium has been dramatically reduced and all sides report private ongoing negotiations among Iran, the UN Security Council Permanent members, Germany and the European Union are making progress.

...

It remains hard to see precisely how an agreement can be crafted that allows Iran to pursue uranium enrichment while providing the United States and others confidence that Iran will remain a non-nuclear weapon state. Trust, despite three months of progress, remains in short supply. This is not surprising after 30 plus years of isolation and hostility.

...

The parties have endorsed, for now, Iran's ability to continue enriching uranium, as long as the enrichment product does not exceed 5 percent U-235.
News: Does Iran Honor the Joint Plan of Action Negotiated with the P5+1 in November 2013?

Huffington Post, 4-21-2014

Allied position:
Need guarantee of long lead time in case Iran wanted to build bomb.

Maximum demand put forward by some: Iran ought to give up its enrichment program and dismantle centrifuge facilities in Natanz and Fordow.

Iran’s position:
Would like to keep enrichment capabilities at present level (~20,000 centrifuges) for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Possible compromise:
   o maximum enrichment to 5% U-235
   o limited amount of 5% LEU at any time allowed in Iran
   o limited number of centrifuges

   ➔ suggested guidance: limit number of centrifuges and 5% U-235 to what is needed to operate the Bushehr nuclear power plant

Viability of any solution critically depends on measures building trust btw parties.
Building Trust: Inspection of the Nuclear Program in Iran by the IAEA

Board of Governors

GOV/INF/2014/10
Date: 17 April 2014
Restricted Distribution
Original: English

For official use only

Status of Iran’s Nuclear Programme in relation to the Joint Plan of Action

Report by the Director General
Building Trust: Inspection of the Nuclear Program in Iran by the IAEA

1. As foreshadowed in GOV/2014/2, this report provides information on the status of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s (Iran’s) nuclear programme in relation to the “voluntary measures” that Iran has agreed to undertake as part of the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) agreed between the E3+3 and Iran on 24 November 2013. According to the JPA, the first step would be time-bound (six months) and renewable by mutual consent. The JPA took effect on 20 January 2014.

2. The Agency confirms that since 20 January 2014, Iran has:
   
i. not enriched uranium above 5% U-235 at any of its declared facilities;

   ii. not operated cascades in an interconnected configuration at any of its declared facilities;

   iii. completed the dilution – down to an enrichment level of no more than 5% U-235 – of half of the nuclear material that had been in the form of UF₆ enriched up to 20% U-235 on 20 January 2014.

Good example, how arms control and existing instruments of arms control can create trust and can be used to provide valuable options in resolving international conflict.

It is important to remember that well concerted sanctions, the related diplomatic efforts and the strong US military presence have played a key role in bringing Iran to the table.

In view of many diverting interests and a 30 year history of mistrust and conflict the outcome of the present negotiations remains highly uncertain.
What should the goal of the P5+1 negotiations be?

(A) Iran should give up Uranium enrichment and receive its reactor fuel from Russia.

(B) Limited enrichment to 5% to produce its own reactor fuel.

(C) Unlimited enrichment of LEU.
Will the IAEA be able to monitor the implementation of a possible P5+1 agreement with Iran?

(A) The IAEA safeguards can be sufficient to monitor the implementation of restrictions on the nuclear program of Iran.

(B) The IAEA safeguards only will cover declared facilities and it cannot be excluded that a clandestine program will be brought on its way (similar to the underground Fordow complex that was not disclosed until discovered by intelligence services).

(C) The IAEA safeguards will be sufficient only with additional agreements on inspections that will serve to search for clandestine nuclear facilities in Iran.
The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

• Signed in 1968 (Johnson Administration), went into force in 1970, had 25-year term
• Renewed for an *indefinite* term in May 1995
• State Parties meet every 5 years to review effectiveness of treaty & propose improvements of implementation
• *Divides states of the world into two classes*
  — Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) *defined* by treaty as states that have tested before 1968: US, USSR/R, UK, Fr, PRC only
  — Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS)
• *Grand bargain*
  — NWs states agree to share peaceful applications of nuclear technologies with NNS + commitment to pursue reduction of nuclear arsenals
  — NNW states agree not to develop or acquire NWs
• De-facto NWS Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea are the only non-signatories
• Inclusion of Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea as NPT NWS would require amending the treaty, which would be tantamount to re-negotiating it; such a negotiation is generally regarded as highly undesirable
Iraq, Libya, Iran, and N. Korea were/are problematic signatories

- Post Iraq War searches provided definitive assurance that the Iraqi NW program is eliminated
- Libya ended nuclear weapons program
- North Korea withdrew from the NPT, launched a NW program (U enrichment and Pu reprocessing), declared possession of nuclear weapons in March 2005 and tested them in 2006, in 2009 and 2013. Accession of Kim Jong-un in 2011 has lead to present crisis with significant uncertainty with regards to North Korea’s intentions.
- Concerns that Iran may be close to acquiring nuclear weapons continue to exist.
The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference agreed on a document called “Principles and Objectives on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”

The 2000 NPT Five-Year Review produced an agreed list of the most relevant next steps (13 steps)

The 2005 NPT Five-Year Review failed to produce a final communiqué

The 2010 NPT Five-Year Review was more successful
Monitoring of NPT: IAEA Safeguard System

• IAEA safeguards system: aims to detect and deter diversion of nuclear materials used for civilian purposes to materials used to make weapons.

• IAEA currently monitors more than 800 facilities in more than 100 nations.
The 1997 NPT Additional Protocol

- Iraq case 1991: inability to detect clandestine nuclear activities suggests that IAEA nuclear safeguards are not comprehensive enough.

- 93+2 program to enhance efficiency and effectiveness of nuclear safeguards → broader range of facilities, environmental sampling, inspections with short term notice

- Model for Additional Protocol (INFCIRC-540) in 1997

- As of December 2010 signed by 139 states, in force in 104 out of 189 Parties to the NPT
Limits on SU and US Nuclear Weapons Systems

• Meaningful limitations on nuclear weapons systems proved difficult to achieve during the Cold War

• The nuclear arms race was driven by intense fear and became deeply ingrained due to many different factors
  — Competition and distrust between the two superpowers
  — Complications created by the NW programs of UK, Fr, and PRC
  — Domestic political, institutional, and economic forces, which drove the arms race in each of the NW states
  — The first limits on NW systems were achieved in 1972 as a result of the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) negotiations during the first Nixon administration
  — Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was the architect, chief negotiator, and super salesman of the SALT-I Treaty
The Two Parts of SALT I

The first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-I) had two parts, one important, the other minor —

• The ABM Treaty (ABMT) was the important agreement

• The “interim agreement on offensive strategic nuclear delivery systems” (R > 5,500 km = 3,400 miles) was a minor, temporary agreement

• However, the parties could not agree on one without the other, because both parties (US and USSR) agreed that limitations on offensive nuclear delivery systems would be impossible without limitations on defensive systems
The 1972 ABM Treaty


—Each party agrees not to deploy any defensive system of nationwide scope against *strategic* ballistic missiles

—Each party agrees not to develop the *basis* for a nationwide ABM system

—Two limited deployments permitted (100 interceptors)
  » Defend national capital (Soviets were deploying this)
  » Defend single ICBM field (US deploying this)
  » Reduction to one of the above sites by a 1974 Protocol

—No prohibition on defenses against non-strategic ballistic missiles or cruise missiles
The SALT I Interim Agreement

• Bilateral agreement; UK had ceased to be a major player, and progress would have been impossible if FR and PRC were at the table

• Established a *five-year freeze* at existing levels of *nuclear delivery systems*; those in production allowed to be deployed

• No reductions required on either side

• Parties pledge to conduct follow-on negotiations for more comprehensive measures “as soon as possible”. The Interim Agreement resulted in unequal numbers in US and USSR triads---led to strong objections in US Senate.

• The opportunity to ban MIRVed ICBMs and MIRVed SLBMs was not considered in the negotiations which is regarded by many as a serious mistake in Cold War arms control

• There was long delay before a true treaty (SALT-II) on offensive system was reached in 1979 near the end of the Carter Administration.

• SALT-II was never ratified and never in force
The SALT II Treaty

• A small step forward was made in the Ford Administration: the 1974 Vladivostok Agreement

• An agreement ("SALT-II") was completed in Carter Administration after prolonged negotiations in 1979

• Carter withdrew SALT-II from consideration by the U.S. Senate in January 1980, to avoid its rejection. Both sides pledged (a political agreement) to abide by the terms of the treaty; this lasted until 1986

• In 1986 President Reagan declared that the U.S. would no longer be constrained by the terms of the Treaty and explicitly ordered nuclear weapons to be deployed to violate the Treaty’s provisions

• Basic structure:
  —Limit of 2250 total number of SNDVs by 1981
  —Sub-limit on number of MIRVed missiles and Heavy Bombers (HB) with cruise missiles
  —Limit on number of warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs and HBs
  —Numerous other sub-limits and restrictions
The Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty

• Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed on December 8, 1987; entered into force in 1988

• Negotiations started 1981

• Bilateral (USA-USSR) + West German unilateral declaration

• Basic structure:
  — Total global ban of a whole class of ground-based nuclear weapons
  — Applies to delivery systems with a range between 500 and 5,500 km
  — Disarmament by destruction of in total 2,695 missiles
    Soviet Union: 1,836 missiles
    USA: 859 missiles
  — Complete elimination within 3 years (included cruise missiles)
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)

- **1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Provisions**
  - Negotiations began in Reagan Administration in 1982; Gorbachev was in power in the Soviet Union
  - Treaty signed in July 31, 1991 (Bush Administration)
  - Five months later Soviet Union dissolved
  - Treaty contains a of launcher (SNDV) limits and warhead limits (7 year term to reduce to)
  - WH limits expressed in terms of “accountable war heads” (AWHs)
    - >1,600 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and HBs
    - >6,000 total AWHs
      - sublimit: 4,900 AWHs on ICBMs and SLBMs
      - sublimit: 1,500 on Heavy ICBMs (Soviet SS-18s)
      - sublimit: on mobile ICBMs
      - Total ballistic missile “throw-weight” limited to 3,600 metric tons
The START Treaty (cont’d)

— Was the first treaty to require actual *reductions* of strategic nuclear forces

— Counting rules specified for each type of SNDV
  
  » HB equipped with bombs and short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) count as 1 AWH
  
  » HB with ALCMs count as 10, 16, or 20 AWHs

— Treaty duration of 15 years; renewable for additional 5-year terms

— Verification by National Technical Means (NTM) plus cooperative measures

— Entry into Force: Dec 5, 1994 after the “Lisbon Protocol” was signed and ratified

— Expired in December 2009 (second Bush administration made no effort to extend it or put in place a follow-on treaty)
(I) 1989–2000: Nuclear Arms Control in the Post-Cold War Era (Bush I and Clinton)

1992 Lisbon Accord
1993 START II
1996 CTBT
The 1992 Lisbon Protocol

Following the end of Soviet Union as political entity, something had to be done to determine who had successor state responsibility for treaties signed by USSR

—1992 Lisbon Accord (Protocol to START-I and ABM Treaty)

» Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and US signatories

» Russian the successor nuclear weapon state under NPT

» Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to sign NPT as non-nuclear states (and eliminate all NW on their territories)

» Russian bound by START-I obligations

» Ukraine was the last of the newly independent states to complete all the necessary steps of nuclear disarmament
START II

• Bush-Yeltsin signed in Moscow January 3, 1993

• Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle (SNDV) ceiling of 1,600 in START-I unchanged

• Total warhead ceiling reduced to 3,000–3,500

• Warhead counts
  — ICBM + SLBM WH ceiling dropped
  — MIRVed ICBMs completely forbidden
  — All Heavy ICBM (SS-18s) eliminated
  — SLBM WH ceiling of 1,700–1,750 added
  — Mobile ICBM WH ceiling of START-I left at 850

• Warheads downloaded from MIRVed missiles may not be restored

• To remain in force as long as START is in force (December 2009)
START II (cont’d)

- US agreed to help Russians with destruction costs and technologies

- Entry into force in two phases with initial dates
  - Phase 1 complete 7 years after START signed
  - Phase 2 complete in 2003
  - Phase 2 deadline later extended to 2007

- Ratified by US in 1996, but US did not ratify 1997 protocol extending implementation, ABM Treaty succession, and agreement clarifying demarcation line between strategic and theater ballistic missile defenses

- Russian ratification subject to the provision that the US remain bound by the ABM Treaty

- US refusal to make that commitment
START III Talks

• During period 1993–2000 when START II was signed but not in force, major changes were taking place in Russia

• Russia repeatedly expressed interest in WH limits lower than START II limits

• Limit of 2,000-2,500 WH informally agreed between Clinton and Yeltsin

• Russians proposed limits of 1,500 WH

• Some on US side proposed 1,000 WHs (minimum deterrence)

• Verifiable destruction of WHs to be included

• Other transparency measures explored

• Never any formal negotiations

• Lost opportunity of a decade?
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

- Opened for signature in September 1996 in New York
- As of April 2010: 180 signatories, 148 ratifications. Of the 44 in Annex II, 9 have not ratified. They are: China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and the United States
- UN General Assembly Resolution in November 1996 created the Preparatory Commission with its Provisional Technical Secretariat in Vienna.
- The International Monitoring System with 321 stations worldwide is under construction. It comprises of seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide sensors.
History of Test Ban Treaties

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<td>Threshold TBT</td>
<td>July 3, 1974</td>
<td>Dec. 1, 1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comprehensive TBT</td>
<td>Sep. 26, 1996</td>
<td>—</td>
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2013, CTBTO Detects Fission Products from North Korean Nuclear Weapons Test

CTBTO DETECTS RADIOACTIVITY CONSISTENT WITH 12 FEBRU ANNOUNCED NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR TEST

Vienna, 23 April 2013

The CTBTO’s radionuclide network has made a significant detection of radioactive noble gases that could be attributed to the nuclear test announced by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on 12 February 2013.

The detection was made at the radionuclide station in Takasaki, Japan, located at around 1,000 kilometres, or 620 miles, from the DPRK test site. Lower levels were picked up at another station in Ussuriysk, Russia. Two radioactive isotopes of the noble gas xenon were identified, xenon-131m and xenon-133, which provide reliable information on the nuclear nature of the source.

Xenon is a noble gas that cannot be chemically bound and slowly works its way out to the surface of an underground test site.

The depth of the recent DPRK test site has been estimated as 2 km at the CTBTO workshop in Urbana in April 2013.

The ratio of the detected xenon isotopes is consistent with a nuclear fission event occurring more than 50 days before the detection (nuclear fission can occur in both nuclear explosions and nuclear energy production). This coincides very well with announced nuclear test by the DPRK that occurred on 12 February 2013, 55 days before the measurement.
The fission products of neutron induced fission are nuclei with different Mass number $A$, including the Xenon Isotopes $^{131m}\text{Xe}$ and $^{133}\text{Xe}$. 

![Mass number distribution of fission products](image)
A New Approach to Nuclear Weapons

• Bush II Administration took a new approach toward limiting strategic nuclear forces
  — Abandoned the ABM Treaty as not in US interests
  — Abandoned the START II Treaty
  — Limited interest in formal treaties, to avoid restriction to U.S. Sovereignty
  — Expressed desire for friendly relations with Russia

• The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT) was the only product of this new approach
  — Russia insisted that the agreement be a formal treaty.
Strategic Offensive Reductions

SORT was signed in Moscow in May 2002

- It reduce total number of strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700 – 2,200 by Dec 31, 2014
- It would expire Dec 31, 2014 (but can be extended)
  - No sub-limits or other conditions
  - No schedule for reductions
  - de-MIRVing and/or WH destruction not required
  - Non-deployed WHs not counted
  - START-I remains in force
- Parties can withdraw three months after giving notice
- Entered into force in 2003; superseded by New START
Presentation by Dr. Kerry Kartchner, Bureau of International Security and Non-Proliferation in the State Department

Extra Credit Opportunity C

Module 8: Nuclear Arms Control
Weapons of Mass Destruction
A State Department Perspective

29 April 2014

Dr. Kerry Kartchner
Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
Introduction

My role as Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation. ISN known as the Department’s “Swiss Army Knife.”

Presentation Overview

1) The Prague Agenda
2) Four core WMD Challenges
3) Other WMD Issues
First: we will take concrete steps toward a world free of nuclear weapons.

Second: we will strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Third: we will ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon.
Four Core WMD Challenges

1) Preventing the proliferation of WMD
2) Reducing the numbers of WMD
3) Ensuring the non-use of WMD
4) Preparing to respond to WMD Events
Challenge 1: Preventing the Proliferation of WMD

Our goal: Prevent and, where possible roll back, the proliferation of WMD and related technologies on the way to eliminating WMD threats.

Tremendous strides have been made in strengthening global nonproliferation regimes related to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and a host of other multilateral arrangements, are the foundation of our efforts.

Main challenges are countries like Iran, DPRK, and Syria.
U.S. Policy Toward Preventing Proliferation

U.S. policy is to use a dual-track approach of *diplomacy* and *pressure* to address nonproliferation challenges.

Our nonproliferation toolkit includes:

1) engagement with or partners and the broader international community through bilateral cooperation and multilateral fora,

2) Implementing international and domestic sanctions regimes, and

3) Providing foreign assistance aimed at advancing U.S. nonproliferation objectives.

We also lead diplomatic efforts to support and strengthen the NPT, and to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
The fundamental focus of U.S. policy on North Korea remains the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The United States and the international community will not accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state.
Challenge 2: Reducing the Numbers of WMD

The second core WMD challenge is reducing and securing the numbers and amount of WMD available in the world today.

Example: The Nuclear Security Summit process has resulted in securing vast stocks of HEU and plutonium from falling into the hands of terrorists.

2014 Nuclear Security Summit, The Hague, Netherlands
Reducing WMD, cont’d

Example: The Global Partnership—a 28 member nonproliferation and threat reduction initiative—has allocated well over $21 billion worldwide for threat reduction programs in nuclear and radiological security, biosecurity, chemical security, scientist engagement, and facilitating implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540.

Example: The Syria CW elimination effort is also an example of how we reduce and secure WMD.
Reducing WMD, cont’d

Progress in nuclear arms reductions
The Nuclear Security Summit is our main mechanism for reducing and securing WMD.

The third and most recent Nuclear Security Summit was held in The Hague, Netherlands.

Trends are positive:

- number of countries and facilities with HEU and plutonium is decreasing;
- security at storage sites is improving;
- more countries are prepared to counter nuclear smuggling;
- more countries are seeking international advice and assistance;
- and the global nuclear security architecture is stronger.
The third challenge is to ensure that countries and non-state actors refrain from using weapons of mass destruction.

Maintaining and enhancing the “taboo” on the use of WMD requires a “whole of government” approach and strong international partnerships and coalitions.

Deterrence is no longer just about threatening retaliation.

Military component remains essential, but greater emphasis now must be placed on diplomacy and engagement.
U.S. Policy toward Preventing the Use of WMD

U.S. policy contributes to promoting the non-use of WMD by:

- Raising the bar for proliferators and WMD users;
- Helping to develop our partner’s ability to deal with WMD;
- Ensuring a strong emphasis on holding violators accountable, and imposing sanctions or other costs where necessary.

• No one understands better than the U.S. the effect that using WMD has and we want to extend our 65 year record of non-use.
Challenge 4: Preparing to Respond to WMD Use

The fourth and final challenge is being prepared to respond to WMD use, and to mitigate the consequences of WMD incidents.

Nevada-based nuclear response team departs for Japan, March 2011.
U.S. Policy Toward Responding to WMD Use-Examples

ISN leads U.S. participation in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).

We also negotiate counter nuclear smuggling Joint Action Plans with key partner countries to help build their capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear smuggling incidents.

We also have a Foreign Consequence Management team that helps partner nations develop national level capabilities to respond effectively to chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear catastrophic incidents.
We also help build the capacity of allies and other key nations at risk:

1) to better combat nuclear terrorism;
2) to counter nuclear smuggling; and,
3) to prepare for managing the consequences of WMD use.

Being better prepared to respond has not only contributed to the security of these partners, but has enhanced U.S. national security and global strategic stability as well.

Being prepared is itself a deterrent.
Summary

1) Prevent proliferation by strengthening the nonproliferation regimes for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and materials.

2) Reduce and secure WMD through multilateral initiatives and support.

3) Deter the use of WMD by both military and diplomatic means.

4) Prepare to respond to WMD use by countering WMD smuggling, preventing terrorist use of WMD, and building capacity for consequence management.
Internships and Exchanges

Internship opportunities are offered for each semester of the academic year. Application deadlines are as follows:

— July 1st for Spring 2015
— November 1st for Summer 2015
— March 1st for Fall 2015

For more information on fellowships and internships with the Department of State:

www.careers.state.gov

For more information on exchanges:

www.exchanges.state.gov
Other WMD Issues (part 1)

Status of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure

- The Department of Energy is the custodian of our nuclear weapons infrastructure.
- This modernization is implemented by focusing on recapitalization and refurbishment of existing infrastructure for plutonium, uranium, tritium, high-explosive production, non-nuclear component production, high-fidelity testing and waste disposition.

Status and Future of the CTBT

- CTBT remains a presidential priority.
Other WMD Issues (part 2)

Promoting Multilateral WMD-Related Treaties and Regimes

- This administration has placed a great deal of emphasis on working bilaterally and multilaterally.
- Such collaboration is essential to addressing global WMD issues.

Working with Congress on WMD-Related Issues

- We have enjoyed excellent bipartisan support from Congress on the full range of our nonproliferation initiatives.
Other WMD Issues (part 3)

The Role and Status of Ballistic and Cruise Missile Defense

- Virtually all of our regional and theater missile defense systems also have capabilities against cruise missile threats.

- *Do you think that missile defenses may substitute for nuclear weapons in a future defense-dominant security posture?*

Fora For Discussing Technical Issues of Importance to National Security

- The Secretary’s International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) is one of our most important mechanisms for getting outside technical and political advice on pressing and emerging issues.
Other WMD Issues

Thinking About Future Threats

- Our most urgent priorities are preventing nuclear terrorism and further nuclear proliferation.

- *Which countries or organizations do you feel represent the most serious proliferation threats in the future?*

Measures to prevent and control cyber attacks

- This issue has been increasingly important to the State Department.

- The State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues was established in Feb. 2011 to centralize and focus Departmental resources and attention to this area.
End of Presentation by Dr. Kerry Kartchner
ICES forms are available online

To use ICES Online, click the following URL:

https://ices.cte.uiuc.edu/

Please participate! Your feedback will help us

(1) to further improve the class and to
(2) solicit the support needed to continue
the course in the future! (Physics does not receive funds from the University or the College to teach PHYS-280).

Please participate !! (so far 13 of 65 …)
Movie Presentation: “The Gate Keepers”

In the Lucy Ellis Lounge, Room 1080 in the Foreign Languages Building

Thursday, May 1 at 7:00 p.m.

Extra credit requires: (1) Attend events (signup sheet!)

(2) Submit 2 page essay by Thursday May 8th at 5:00pm (electronic copy only)
2009–present: Nuclear Arms Control in the Present Era (Obama)
Current Nuclear Arms Control Priorities of the Obama Administration

- A treaty to reduce the number of tactical nuclear weapons
- An internationally-controlled “nuclear fuel bank” for reactor fuel
- Ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
- A treaty to end the further production of fissile material

First steps (1) New START

(2) Nuclear Security Summit
New START

- Replaces SORT to expire December 2014

Initial Meeting between Presidents Obama and Medvedev in April 2009 in London.

Negotiations during 2009:
- First round: 19–20 May, Moscow
- Second round: 1–3 June, Geneva
- Third round: 22–24 June, Geneva
- Fourth round: 22–24 July, Geneva
- Fifth Round: 5–7 September, Geneva
- Sixth round: 21–28 September, Geneva
- Seventh round: 19–30 October, Geneva
- Eighth round: 9 November, Geneva

Signed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev in April 8th, 2010.
New START In Force Feb-5 2011

- Replaces SORT to expire December 2014

- Signed April-8-2010 (President’s Obama and Medvedev)
- Ratified by Senate 12-22-2010, Duma 1-26-2011
- Entered into force February 5th 2011
- Implementation deadline February 5th 2018
- Duration February 5th 2021

- Limits deployed strategic warheads to 1550

- Limits strategic delivery vehicles to 800 with up to 700 deployed

- Verification methods: national technical means, site inspections, data exchange, notification protocols with regards to monitored sites
The Dangers of Nuclear Proliferation

• Governments unfriendly to the U.S. are increasingly trading with one another to obtain nuclear weapons

• Nuclear weapon materials and technology are increasingly being proliferated by private networks, like the A.Q. Khan network based in Pakistan

• Theft, diversion, and sale of nuclear materials and technologies increases the danger of nuclear terrorism
Availability of Uranium from “Atoms for Peace”

Atoms for Peace

- During the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. Atoms for Peace program and the corresponding Soviet program constructed hundreds of research reactors, including reactors for export to more than 40 other countries.

- These reactors were originally supplied with low-enriched Uranium (LEU), which is not usable for nuclear weapons, but demands for better reactor performance and longer-lived fuel led to a switch to weapons-grade Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU).
Availability of Highly Enriched Uranium

Effect of “Atoms for Peace”
Availability of Nuclear Weapon Materials in the Former Soviet Union

Building 116 at the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow had enough HEU for a bomb at its research reactor, but had an overgrown fence and no intrusion detectors or alarms, an example of the poor state of security at many nuclear facilities after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Several countries are capable of developing mechanisms to launch SRBMs, MRBMs, or land-attack cruise missiles from forward-based ships or other platforms. Some may develop such systems before 2015.

U.S. territory is more likely to be attacked with [nuclear weapons] using non-missile delivery means—most likely from terrorists—than by missiles, primarily because non-missile delivery means are —

• less costly
• easier to acquire
• more reliable and accurate

They also can be used without attribution.

— Unclassified summaries of the most recent National Intelligence Estimates of Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015
Functions of Verification

- It allows the parties to **assess an agreement’s state of implementation**. By establishing how each party is fulfilling its obligations, verification gives a good indication about the functioning of the agreement.

- It **discourages non-compliance** with agreement provisions. Because parties know that breeches of obligations carry the risk of detection, they should be less inclined to attempt to depart secretly from their commitments.

- It provides **timely warning of violation(s)** of agreement conditions. In case of non-compliance, verification can reveal transgressions before these have a chance to turn alarming.

- By checking that obligations are indeed being honored, it helps **generate confidence** that the agreement and its verification mechanism are functioning as intended, thereby fostering trust and confidence between the parties.
Verification Means and Procedures

1. Monitoring technologies

- Remote sensors in the visible, infra-red or radar spectra, based on satellites, aircraft or on the ground
- Signal and electronic reconnaissance
- Seismological, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasound monitoring
- On-site sensors for non-destructive measurement, e.g. portal perimeter monitoring; measurement of weight, length, acoustics, light (UV, infrared, visible), electrical and magnetic fields; passive radiation measurement, active radiation (x-ray, gamma ray, beta particles, protons, neutrons)

2. Verification methods

- International Agency for Verification
- Cooperative fact finding on compliance
- Consultation
- Dispute settlement

3. Cooperative procedures

- Nuclear archaeology
- Initial declarations and data exchange
- Identification & item counting of objects (tagging, fingerprinting, registration,
- Confidence-building measures
- Joint overflights (Open Skies)
- Accountancy, control and surveillance
- Preventive controls at nuclear facilities
- Baseline and routine inspections
- Challenge inspections of suspected facilities (anytime-anywhere)
- Personal observation of destruction and suspected activities

4. Societal verification

- Open sources, scientific knowledge
- Citizen reporting, protect whistle-blowing
- Espionage
Introduction to Nuclear Safeguards

What are Nuclear Safeguards?

“…the objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.” - IAEA, INFCIRC 153

A method by which a state or an international organization prevents or detects the theft or misuse of nuclear material by an adversary.

- An adversary can be an individual, a sub-state group or – in the case of an international organization – a state.
Introduction to Nuclear Safeguards (cont’d)

• Although a state will use safeguards for its own domestic nuclear program, this module will focus primarily on safeguards through the scope of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

• When the IAEA enters a safeguards agreement with a state and places safeguards at that state’s facilities, the IAEA must treat the state as a potential adversary. This leads to several challenges:

  • The IAEA must be able to perform its mission to detect Significant Quantities of NEM (SQ) within the specified timely manner.
  
  • But IAEA safeguards cannot hinder or inconvenience the regular operation of the nuclear facility.
  
  • The state can unilaterally modify or expel IAEA safeguards (example: North Korea).
Questions

Extra Credit Opportunity C

Count Down to Zero
Movie Presentation: “The Gate Keepers”

In the Lucy Ellis Lounge, Room 1080
in the Foreign Languages Building

Thursday, May 1 at 7:00 p.m.

Extra credit requires: (1) Attend events (signup sheet!)
(2) Submit 2 page essay by Thursday
   May 8th at 5:00pm (electronic copy only)
PHYS/GLBL 280: Session 29

Guest Presentation by Special Agent
David Coonan, FBI Coordinator for WMD in the Springfield Division

Announcements:
Extra Credit Opportunity D
Final
Final Preparation
ICES

Count Down to Zero
Guest Speaker Today:

FBI Special Agent David Coonan

WMD Coordinator for the Springfield Division
Movie Presentation: “The Gate Keepers”

Prompt for essay is available online:


Deadline:

Thursday May 8th at 5:00pm
⇒ electronic copy only!
The final exam will take place on

**Wednesday May 14\(^{th}\) from 8-11am**
Location will be announced by e-mail.

Scope of exam:

- 120 multi-choice problems
- 70 questions on arsenals, defenses, arms control + news
- 50 questions on material covered before midterm

50% of the questions will be taken from the final exams of the last 3 years (available from the course web-page)
Vote on time slot for review session (five votes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Slot</th>
<th>Can Do</th>
<th>Can Do But Difficult</th>
<th>Can’t</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunday, May 11\textsuperscript{th} 6pm</td>
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<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sunday, May 11\textsuperscript{th} 7pm</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monday, May 12\textsuperscript{th} 6pm</td>
<td>A</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monday, May 12\textsuperscript{th} 7pm</td>
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<td>C</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monday, May 12\textsuperscript{th} 8pm</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Location will be announced by e-mail!
Suggestions for Final Prep

(1) Study old final exams and use slides + posted reading assignments to verify your answers.

(2) Review all news discussed in class.

(3) Bring questions to review session.

(4) Review course slides.

(5) Review reading materials.
ICES Course Evaluation Forms Available Online

ICES forms are available online

To use ICES Online, click the following URL:

https://ices.cte.uiuc.edu/

Please participate! Your feedback will help us

(1) to further improve the class and to
(2) solicit the support needed to continue
the course in the future! (the Physics
department does not receive funds from the
University or College to teach PHYS-280).

33 of 65 so far, thank you!! (deadline is Thursday!)
Count Down to Zero

Finish Video Presentation
End of Module on Arms Control & End of Class

Thank you for your interest!

Best Wishes!!
Safeguards Agreements

• IAEA safeguards agreements are separated by two general categories:
  • weapons states (WS) as described by the NPT.
  • non-weapons states (NWS)

• WS agreements are generally less stringent than those with NWS and exist mostly on “good faith”. (There is little need to prevent a WS from diverting material to build weapons.)

• Issues between NWS under safeguards and the IAEA may be referred to the UN Security Council. Such issues may include:
  • Noncompliance with agreements
  • Detection of non-declared activities
  • Detection of a large amount of missing nuclear material.
Constraining Horizontal Nonproliferation

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) —

The Agency’s Safeguards (INFCIRC/26, 1961; INFCIRC/66, 1966)
- Limited to items and materials transferred from other countries.
- Still applies for Israel, India and Pakistan

NPT Nuclear Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/153, 1972)
- “Full scope”: covering all declared special nuclear material.
- Limited to declared materials and facilities.

NPT Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540, 1997)
- Strengthen effectiveness and improve efficiency of nuclear safeguards.
Constraining Horizontal Nonproliferation

Nuclear Safeguards according to INFCIRC/153

“Full scope”: covering all declared special nuclear material.
More than 900 facilities in 71 countries are under inspection.
There are 250 inspectors, costing $70 million per year.
Accountancy and physical inventory of materials
Containment and surveillance
Non-discriminatory approach —
Not cost-effective (79% is spent in Canada, Europe, & Japan)
Limited to declared materials and facilities.
Verification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

The Additional Protocol

Comprehensive declaration of current and planned materials and facilities
Regular updates of the declaration

Complementary access on short notice (24 hours)

Environmental sampling
  • location specific (swipe samples)
  • wide-area (to be decided by the Board of Governors)

In addition

Open source information
Satellite imagery
Detection of Horizontal Proliferation

Example: Natanz, Iran
Apparent attempt to hide an underground uranium centrifuge enrichment facility
Nuclear Safeguards
Key Safeguards Terms

• Significant Quantity (SQ): the approximate quantity of nuclear material in respect of which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded. SQs include losses during manufacturing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Significant Quantity (SQ)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plutonium (&lt;80% Pu-238)</td>
<td>8 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U-233</td>
<td>8 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEU (&gt;20% U-235)</td>
<td>25 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEU (&lt;20% U-235)</td>
<td>75 kg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• Timely Detection: the time within which a detection must be made is based on the time required to weaponize the material in question.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material Form</th>
<th>Conversion Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pu, HEU or U-233 metal</td>
<td>7-10 Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pu, HEU or U-233 oxides or nitrates (pure and unirradiated)</td>
<td>1-3 Weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pu, HEU or U-233 in irradiated fuels</td>
<td>1-3 Months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uranium with &lt; 20% U-235 or U-233</td>
<td>1 Year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A facility operator may attempt to divert material through one of the following methods:

- Tampering with IAEA equipment
- Falsifying records
- Borrowing nuclear material from another site
- Replacing nuclear material with dummy material
- Preventing access to the facility.
Safeguards Methods

Safeguards at nuclear facilities is carried out through various methods and tools that can be described by a few general categories:

- Nondestructive Assaying (NDA)
- Destructive Analysis (DA)
- Containment/Surveillance (C/S)
- Environmental Sampling (ES)
While assaying provides measurements for material accountancy, C/S is used for area monitoring and to ensure that data is not falsified.

Some C/S items include:

- Surveillance cameras
- Area monitors
- Seals/Tags
- Tamper indicating devices
Nondestructive Assay (NDA)

NDA tools can consist of any measurement device that does not destroy the sample.

- Mass scales
- Radiation detectors/neutron counters
- Cherenkov radiation viewing devices

Advantages:

- Can be operated in-situ, remotely
- Cost-effective
Cherenkov Radiation

Destructive Analysis (DA)

As the name implies, DA requires destruction of a small sample of material.

- Mass spectrometry
- Titration
- Radiochemical analysis

Advantages:

- More precise than NDA measurements
- Lower detections limits
CTBTO Detects Fission Products from DPRK Test

U.S. and Lithuania Sign Agreement for Cooperation on Countering Nuclear Smuggling

Media Note
Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
April 23, 2013

Today, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Linas Antanas Linkevičius strengthened their countries’ partnership to combat nuclear terrorism by signing an agreement to advance protection against nuclear and radiological smuggling.

This “Joint Action Plan between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on Combating Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials and Related Technology” expresses the intention of the two governments to work together to enhance Lithuania’s capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear smuggling incidents and to share experience with other countries in the region. The plan is the eleventh such agreement concluded, and Lithuania is the program’s second European Union and NATO partner. It is also one of the many steps the United States and Lithuania are taking to implement the commitments both nations made at the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul.

The newly signed plan includes steps to enhance Lithuania’s control of its radioactive materials, foster cooperation among its domestic agencies, expand the country’s role as a mentor to regional partners, and review and strengthen the Lithuanian Penal Code to ensure all types of nuclear smuggling cases can be prosecuted. Lithuania also has established a Nuclear Security Center of Excellence, and the United States is supporting Lithuania’s efforts to develop a counter nuclear smuggling curriculum for this center and host regional training courses.
Environmental Sampling (ES)

• Part of the goal for IAEA safeguards is to provide assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear activity in a state.

• All nuclear processes emit trace particles of material into the environment.

• ES helps the IAEA to reach a conclusion on undeclared activity through various environmental signatures and observables.
  
  • May consist of:
    — Soil and water samples
    — Smears
    — Bulk or particle analysis
Sampling and Analysis of Atmospheric Gases

Need: To detect the presence and nature of nuclear fuel cycle process activities at suspected locations

Application: Away-from-site (stand-off) detection

Solution:

Use on-site LIBS to determine the nature and history of compounds and elements

Figure 10: Basic Methodology 1
A mobile on-site laboratory samples and concentrates atmospheric-borne pollutants. Local meteorological conditions and the GPS location are also recorded.

Figure 11: Basic Methodology 2
Samples are brought to a field laboratory for analysis.

Figure 12: Basic Methodology 3
The sample analysis data is combined with meteorological data and suitable atmospheric modelling to provide an estimate of the source direction.

Figure 13: Basic Methodology 4
The airborne material is identified and the probable location of the source is estimated.

**Laser-Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS)**

**Need:** determine whether, or not, an undeclared location has been used for storing radiological material

**Application:** both on-site and off-site analysis.

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**Figure 6: Basic Methodology 2**

LIBS is comprised of (i) a laser system to ablate the surface of the material to be analyzed to create a micro-vapour, and (ii) a spectrometer to generate a spectroscopic profile of the micro-vapour’s constituent components.

Material Unaccounted For (MUF): The accounting difference between the amount of recorded material transferred in and out of a facility and recorded inventory at the beginning and end of a particular reporting period.

\[ \text{MUF} \equiv (\text{Starting Inventory} + \text{Inputs} - \text{Outputs} - \text{Ending Inventory}) \]

- MUF is never equal to zero for any facility!
- MUF can be both positive and negative (material created or lost).
- Each variable that contributes to the MUF calculation is based on measurements to quantify the amount of nuclear material in the facility.

All measurements have errors!!

.
Distribution and Probabilities of Measurement Results

68% of all measurements yield results within $1\,\sigma$ of the “true” value.

Ref: “Standard Deviation”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sigma Level</th>
<th>Percent Confidence</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>± 1σ</td>
<td>68% Confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>± 2σ</td>
<td>95% Confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>± 3σ</td>
<td>99% Confidence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Problem with accountancy at bulk material facilities

MUF = Material Unaccounted For

The problem of bulk material accountancy.
Limits of Material Accountancy

Other examples —

United Kingdom (Sellafield)

MUF =

- 2003: 19.1 kg
- 2001: 5.6 kg
- 1999: 24.9 kg
- 1998: +21.0 kg
- 1996: +15.0 kg

South Africa

6 nuclear weapons dismantled and HEU transferred to safeguards, but material balance showed enough HEU for 7 weapons was produced.

Solution: Cooperation and transparency.
Basic Requirements for Verifying Nuclear Disarmament

1. **No NW or relevant nuclear material held back and hidden**
   - Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons need to be disarmed completely
   - Not retain single nuclear warhead or significant quantity of NW material
   - Dismantle nuclear weapons production system.

2. **No break-out of ban to develop or manufacture NW**
   a) **“Disinvent” nuclear weapons, increase threshold against reinvention**
      - Dismantle infrastructure of existing nuclear weapons complex
      - No research or testing for nuclear weapons, not maintain NW expert knowledge
      - Control of dual-use science and technology
   b) **Prevent break-out from nuclear power or nuclear research programs**
      - Prohibition and timely detection of diversion of nuclear materials for NW
      - No production of NW-usable materials nor removal from existing stocks
      - Step-by-step, reduce existing stocks down to zero.

3. **No intentions or reasons to acquire NW**
   - Convince that NW are inherently negative and possession is undesirable.
References

• IAEA Safeguards Glossary (2001 Edition)


• “Introduction to Nuclear Safeguards: Nondestructive Analysis,” David Chichester, Idaho National Laboratory, 2009

• Image References:
  • “Standard Deviation,” Wikipedia
  • “Cherenkov Radiation,” Wikipedia
Analysis of North Korea’s Nuclear Test

On October 9, 2006, North Korea announced that it had carried out an underground nuclear test.

One week later, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence confirmed detection of radioactive debris and stated that North Korea had conducted a nuclear explosion with a yield of less than 1 kiloton.

Although the test did not succeed as planned, North Korea might have been testing a lower-yield design.

- How powerful was the explosion?
- Was it a nuclear test?
- If nuclear, was the test successful?

Detection of North Korea's Nuclear Test

Figure 2: Seismic activity since 1990; the star shows the location of the North Korean nuclear test explosion
Source: United States Geological Survey (USGS) – National Earthquake Information Center (NEIC)

Source: Martin B. Kalinowski, Ole Ross, Analysis and Interpretation of the North Korean Nuclear Test, INESAP Information Bulletin No. 27, Dec. 2006
### Parameters of seismic analysis of the North Korean event on October 9, 2006

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Source: Martin B. Kalinowski, Ole Ross, Analysis and Interpretation of the North Korean Nuclear Test, INESAP Information Bulletin No. 27, Dec. 2006
Nuclear test yields (kt TNT equivalent) and measured body wave magnitude mb

Source: Martin B. Kalinowski, Ole Ross, Analysis and Interpretation of the North Korean Nuclear Test, INESAP Information Bulletin No. 27, Dec. 2006
Wind field trajectories calculated with HYSPLIT from North Korean test site for two starting heights

Source: Martin B. Kalinowski, Ole Ross, Analysis and Interpretation of the North Korean Nuclear Test, INESAP Information Bulletin No. 27, Dec. 2006
HYPLIT model of plume above Sea of Japan 48 hours after explosion with dispersion factor of 10–15 averaged from 0–500 m above ground level.
2006 North Korean Test: Uncertainties

North Korea informed China to conduct a nuclear test, with a yield in the range of 4 kilotons.

Such an explosion in hard rock would produce a seismic event with a magnitude of about 4.9 on the Richter scale, uncertainty in seismic magnitude of 0.5: shift in yield by factor 4.6

- The U.S. Geological Survey reported a seismic magnitude of 4.2.
- South Korea’s state geology research center reported magnitude between 3.58 and 3.7, and estimated a yield equivalent to 550 tons TNT.
- Terry Wallace (Los Alamos): estimated a yield of 0.5 to 2 kilotons, with 90 percent confidence that the yield is less than 1 kiloton
- Lynn R. Sykes (Columbia University) estimated a yield of 0.4 kilotons, with 68 percent confidence that it was between 0.2 and 0.7 kilotons and 95 percent probability that it was less than 1 kiloton

→ Very effective detection of underground sub-kiloton explosions

Was It a Nuclear Test?

Possible conventional explosion: Five hundred tons of mixture of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO), an inexpensive explosive used in mining, would fill the last 60 meters of a 3m x 3m tunnel.

Radioactivity was detected in the atmosphere of the region two days after the explosion.

North Korea has enough plutonium to make several Nagasaki-type weapons, and a clandestine uranium-enrichment program.

Detection of radioactive xenon isotopes, Xe-133 and Xe-135 (half-lives 5 five days, 0.4 days) indicate an underground nuclear test.

Because Xe-135 decays much more rapidly, the ratio of their concentrations in the plume provides a rough measure of the number of Xe-135 half-lives and therefore the time since the test.
Was It a Successful Test?

Low yield of the 2006 North Korean test

Nagasaki bomb (20 kt): tons of high explosive implode solid subcritical sphere of plutonium to higher density to make it supercritical.

J. Robert Oppenheimer: 2 percent chance that the yield could be lower than 1 kiloton if neutron started the chain reaction just when the plutonium first became critical.

Perhaps North Korean weapon designers tried to go directly to a small weapon of 500-1,000-kilogram for use on missiles

→ Yield of explosion was much less than design yield,

→ Little faith in North Korean nuclear-weapon stockpile
Fact Sheet
Increasing Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

May 3, 2010

The United States is releasing newly declassified information on the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Increasing the transparency of global nuclear stockpiles is important to non-proliferation efforts, and to pursuing follow-on reductions after the ratification and entry into force of the New START Treaty that cover all nuclear weapons: deployed and non-deployed, strategic and non-strategic.
Session 29: News and Discussion

Stockpile. As of September 30, 2009, the U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons consisted of 5,113 warheads. This number represents an 84 percent reduction from the stockpile’s maximum (31,255) at the end of fiscal year 1967, and over a 75 percent reduction from its level (22,217) when the Berlin Wall fell in late 1989. The below figure shows the U.S. nuclear stockpile from 1945 through September 30, 2009.

Warhead Dismantlement. From fiscal years 1994 through 2009, the United States dismantled 8,748 nuclear warheads. Several thousand additional nuclear weapons are currently retired and awaiting dismantlement.

Session 29: News and Discussion

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, 1945-2009*

*Includes active and inactive warheads. Several thousand additional nuclear warheads are retired and awaiting dismantlement.
Understanding Arms Control

- Arms Control is more than a collection of treaties
- Building blocks of the “international control regime”
  
  Example: the nuclear non-proliferation regime
- Establishes international norms and rules
- Is subject to interpretation by outside parties

  Example: the International Court of Justice advisory opinion regarding the use of nuclear weapons (see the next slide)
Early History of Arms Control

Control of conventional weapons has a long history with limited successes

• Pre-modern era
  — Examples: crossbows, dum-dum bullets, …
  — Sometimes religious or moral restrictions applying to all were attempted
  — Rarely were negotiations between equal parties involved
  — Typically, disarmament and arms control were imposed on the vanquished by the victorious
Early History of Arms Control

• Modern era
  — Rush-Bagot (1817) was the first US arms control treaty; limits US and British naval vessels on the Great Lakes
  — 1925 Geneva Protocol: forbids use of poisonous gasses and bacteriological weapons against other signatories (US took until 1975 to ratify!)
  — 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact (nations renounce war as an instrument of national policy)
  — 1920, 1930, and up to about 1935 international Naval Agreements of various sorts to limit battleships, ...
Early History of Arms Control

Arms Control took on a new urgency in the nuclear area —

• A first attempt to achieve nuclear arms control was implicit in Einstein’s letter to President Roosevelt.

• Many scientists involved in the Manhattan project started to think about and discuss how to control nuclear weapons even before the Trinity test and the bombing of Japan. Some argued that nuclear weapons should not be used against people.

• Joseph Rotblat was the only scientist to leave the Manhattan Project when it became clear that none of the Axis powers were on the verge of obtaining the bomb. He continued his efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995.
Early History of Arms Control

The first formal nuclear arms control proposal was put forward by the US and was called the Baruch Plan

• Presented to the newly established UN in 1946

• Proposed that “atomic resources” be put under the control of the UN

• The US promised it would eventually give up all its NWs

• The terms of the plan were highly favorable to the US and unacceptable to the SU

• The 1949 nuclear test by the Soviet Union was its definitive response
Subsequent nuclear arms control proposals were grandiose and impractical, often advocating “General and Complete (conventional and nuclear) Disarmament”

The UN continued to be an important forum for discussions and proposals

- UN Disarmament Commission created (1952)
  - Subcommittee of Five (US, UK, Fr, Ch, SU)
- Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva (1962-1969)
- Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (1969-1978)
- Committee on Disarmament (1979-1983)
- Conference on Disarmament (CD: 1984 - present)
- UN General Assembly, First Committee (Disarmament and International Security)
Early History of Arms Control

The three existing NW states (the US, SU, and UK) began trilateral discussions outside the United Nations framework (China and France were not involved)

The importance of arms control was recognized in the United States by the creation of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in 1961 by President Kennedy

- The US was the first government to do this
- The Republican-dominated Senate brought intense pressure to bear on the Clinton administration to get rid of the ACDA and in 1998 it was eliminated
- ACDA’s responsibilities were transferred to the State Department, but not its technical expertise
The First Nuclear Arms Control Efforts Failed

- First attempts to control spread of nuclear arms Initiated by scientists of the Manhattan Project (see, e.g., the Franck Report)
  - Attempt was a failure but such is not uncommon when making policy in a new and unfamiliar area
- Follow-on attempts (“Complete and General Disarmament”, “Atoms for Peace”) under UN auspices were also failures
  - Nonetheless, important lessons were learned:
    - Attack a piece of the problem (e.g., nuclear testing)
    - Choose the best venue (e.g., bilateral, trilateral)
International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory opinion of July 8, 1996, on the Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons

A. Unanimously, There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons;

B. By eleven votes to three, There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such;

C. Unanimously, A threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter and that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51, is unlawful;

D. Unanimously, A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons;

Art. 2(4) UN Charter: All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

Art. 51: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
International Court of Justice (ICJ)

Advisory opinion of July 8, 1996, on the

Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons

E. By seven votes to seven, by the President's casting vote, it follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law; However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake;

F. Unanimously, there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.
Compare with NPT Article VI

“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”
Process of signature, ratification, and entry into force.

Example:

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Views on Nuclear Disarmament Verification

Canberra Commission (1996): "[b]efore states agree to eliminate nuclear weapons they will require a **high level of confidence** that verification arrangements would detect promptly any attempt to cheat the disarmament process."

U.S. National Academy of Sciences (CISAC 1998): "even the most effective verification system that can be envisioned would **not produce complete confidence** that a small number of nuclear weapons had not been hidden or fabricated in secret. More fundamentally, the **knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons** cannot be erased from the human mind. Even if every nuclear warhead were destroyed, the current nuclear weapons states, and a growing number of other technologically advanced states, would be **able to build nuclear weapons within a few months** or few years of a national decision to do so."

Steve Fetter: "Although no verification regime could provide **absolute assurance** that former nuclear-weapon states had **not hidden a small number** of nuclear weapons or enough nuclear material to build a small stockpile, verification could be good enough to reduce remaining uncertainties to a level that might be tolerable in a more transparent and trusting international environment. And although the **possibility of rapid break-out** will be ever present in modern industrial society, verification could provide the steady reassurance that would be necessary to dissipate residual fears of cheating."

→ Link between verifiability and security environment.
Main Tasks for NWFW Verification

Baseline information exchange and data gathering: Identify the current status of the nuclear-weapons complex with reasonable accuracy without proliferating sensitive information.

Disarmament: Monitor the agreed path of reducing nuclear arms and eliminating the nuclear-weapons complex within tolerable limits of uncertainty and sufficient confidence.

Prevent rearmament: During the transformation to and within a nuclear-weapon-free world, observe any objects and detect any activities that might indicate a nuclear-weapons capability.
Nuclear Safeguards

The Nuclear Safeguards topics:

• What are safeguards?
• Safeguards agreements
• Key terms and concepts
• Assaying
• Containment and surveillance
• Environmental sampling
Fission of about 60 grams of plutonium would produce a yield of 1 kiloton and 2 grams each of Xe-133 and Xe-135, which can be detected at levels of about 1,000 and 100 atoms per cubic meter of air.

By the end of the third day, the plume would have traveled about 1,000 km in a zig-zag track over the Sea of Japan and might be 1 km high by 200 km wide (Martin Kalinowski).

If the radioactive xenon produced by a 1-kiloton underground explosion were released into the atmosphere at a typical rate of 0.1 percent per day of the undecayed xenon, the concentration of Xe-133 and Xe-135 in the plume would still be 100 and 10 times above the detection limit. That would verify that it was a nuclear explosion.

Detection of Xe-133 alone after even a week or more could in itself confirm the nuclear nature of the explosion, but its trajectory would have to be “backcast” to make sure that it was not due to leakage from reactors in South Korea or Japan.
Introduction

After the United States developed and used nuclear weapons against Japan in 1945 and afterward deployed them widely, other countries developed and deployed nuclear weapons ("horizontal proliferation"), and the United States and the Soviet Union accumulated enormous numbers of nuclear weapons ("vertical proliferation").

First nuclear explosions

- USA 1945
- USSR 1949
- UK 1952
- France 1960
- China 1964
Two goals of nuclear arms control:

**Counter horizontal proliferation:**

- Stop the spread of nuclear arms to more countries
  - prevent

**Counter vertical proliferation and promote disarmament:**

- Control existing arsenals across life-cycle (research, development, test, production, deployment, use):
  - limit
  - freeze
  - disarm
  - ban
Examples of major nuclear arms control agreements

Horizontal non-proliferation
Vertical non-proliferation
Disarmament

NPT  CTBT  SALT  START

Nuclear Arsenals
Nuclear Testing
Nuclear Material
Goals of Nuclear Arms Control

Success story

The NPT is the central treaty of nuclear non-proliferation regime

Number of State-Parties to the NPT

1970: 43
1975: 96
1985: 132
1995: 182
2005: 189 of 193 sovereign UN member states

(Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea are not parties)
Multi-party goals and conditions of nuclear arms control:

- Advantages for all parties
- National compromises in the sake of an overall security gain
- Getting something in return for own reductions

Reduce conflict situations:

- Arms race
- Preemptive strike
- Cheating
The interceptor rockets for President Bush’s European-based missile defense program:

- Were tested about a dozen times
- Were tested only 3 times
- Were tested only once
- Were never even built
The interceptor rockets for President Bush’s European-based missile defense program:

- Were tested about a dozen times
- Were tested only 3 times
- Were tested only once
- Were never even built
Almost the whole southern hemisphere is covered by Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaties.

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
Latin American Nuclear Free Zone (LANFZ) Treaty (1967)

- Also known as the “Treaty of Tlatelolco,” the area of Mexico City where the diplomats assembled
- Signed in 1967, is of indefinite duration
- Came about through the efforts of five Latin Presidents (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico)
- Motivation came from the 1962 Cuban missile crisis
- The 24 Latin American signatories agree not to develop or introduce NWs
- The four countries outside of region (US, UK, Neth, Fr) agree in a protocol to apply the provisions to their territories in LA
- All five NPT NW states agree in second protocol not to introduce NWs into region of LA
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

- 1959 Antarctic Treaty (first post-WWII treaty)
  - Entire continent a nuclear free zone
  - Numerous other restrictions on state behavior that are unrelated to nuclear weapons

- 1985 South Pacific NWFZ (Treaty of Raratonga)

- 1995 South-East Asian NWFZ (Treaty of Bangkok)

- 1996 African NWFZ (Treaty of Pelindaba)
An Explanation of the Language Used in National Intelligence Estimates – 1

From the November 2007 NIE “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities

What We Mean When We Say: An Explanation of Estimative Language

We use phrases such as *we judge*, *we assess*, and *we estimate*—and probabilistic terms such as *probably* and *likely*—to convey analytical assessments and judgments. Such statements are not facts, proof, or knowledge. These assessments and judgments generally are based on collected information, which often is incomplete or fragmentary. Some assessments are built on previous judgments. In all cases, assessments and judgments are not intended to imply that we have “proof” that shows something to be a fact or that definitively links two items or issues.

In addition to conveying judgments rather than certainty, our estimative language also often conveys 1) our assessed likelihood or probability of an event; and 2) the level of confidence we ascribe to the judgment.
**Estimates of Likelihood.** Because analytical judgments are not certain, we use probabilistic language to reflect the Community’s estimates of the likelihood of developments or events. Terms such as *probably*, *likely*, *very likely*, or *almost certainly* indicate a greater than even chance. The terms *unlikely* and *remote* indicate a less than even chance that an event will occur; they do not imply that an event will not occur. Terms such as *might* or *may* reflect situations in which we are unable to assess the likelihood, generally because relevant information is unavailable, sketchy, or fragmented. Terms such as *we cannot dismiss*, *we cannot rule out*, or *we cannot discount* reflect an unlikely, improbable, or remote event whose consequences are such that it warrants mentioning. The chart provides a rough idea of the relationship of some of these terms to each other.
Confidence in Assessments. Our assessments and estimates are supported by information that varies in scope, quality and sourcing. Consequently, we ascribe high, moderate, or low levels of confidence to our assessments, as follows:

- **High confidence** generally indicates that our judgments are based on high-quality information, and/or that the nature of the issue makes it possible to render a solid judgment. A “high confidence” judgment is not a fact or a certainty, however, and such judgments still carry a risk of being wrong.

- **Moderate confidence** generally means that the information is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence.

- **Low confidence** generally means that the information’s credibility and/or plausibility is questionable, or that the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or that we have significant concerns or problems with the sources.
The Limited (Atmospheric) Test Ban Treaty was first signed in what year?

1957

1963

1968

1972

1975
The Limited (Atmospheric) Test Ban Treaty was first signed in what year?

1957
1963
1968
1972
1975
The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was first signed in what year?

1957

1963

1968

1972

1975
The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was first signed in what year?

1957
1963
1968
1972
1975
iClicker Question

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty limiting ABM systems was signed in what year?

1957
1963
1968
1972
1975
The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty limiting ABM systems was signed in what year?

1957
1963
1968
1972
1975
The United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in what year?

1975
1981
1983
1992
2001
iClicker Question

The United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in what year?

1975
1981
1983
1992
2001
### New START Nuclear Force Levels – U.S.

#### The United States (UPDATED 02/29/10)

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### New START Nuclear Force Levels – Russia

#### Russia

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### New START Nuclear Force Levels – Russia

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#### Bombers

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<th>Total</th>
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<th>4/64</th>
<th>4/64</th>
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<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu-95MS</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>571 (603)</th>
<th>396 (396)</th>
<th>1258</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>809</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Measurement Errors (cont’d)

• Measurement uncertainty can be divided into two categories:
  • Random errors
  • Systematic errors

• Random errors are the statistical errors that are inherently taken into account with any measurement, and are based on the level of precision of the measuring instrument.

• Systematic errors are measurement errors that remain constant over repeated measurements. A systematic error can be caused by a poorly calibrated instrument and will propagate throughout the entire system.

• Uncertainty grows larger as it propagates through a system.
Familiar Concept?

Distribution of RV impact points —

Target

Bias

CEP

Distribution of Impact Points

CEP

Bias

Number of RVs

Range

10p280 Delivery Methods, p. 94

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But how is MUF connected to measurement errors?

• When establishing safeguards at a facility the IAEA sets “confidence levels” based on the total error (random and systematic) of the measurement. The confidence levels are set based on statistics.

• The numerical value of the uncertainty is expressed as “sigma” or \( \sigma \):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sigma Level</th>
<th>Percent Confidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>± 1( \sigma )</td>
<td>68% Confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>± 2( \sigma )</td>
<td>95% Confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>± 3( \sigma )</td>
<td>99% Confidence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Measurement Error Example

Let’s use a basic example to illustrate the connection between MUF, measurement errors and the Sigma intervals.

• Suppose we are running safeguards on a civilian reprocessing plant.
  • A reprocessing plant receives spent nuclear fuel, separates out the high level radioactive waste, and repackages the fuel to be used again in a reactor.
  • A major safeguards concern is the diversion of separated plutonium.

• The Rokkasho reprocessing plant handles over 800 metric tons of heavy metal annually. (Approximately 8 metric tons of plutonium/year.)
Example (cont’d)

If the total analytical error (random and statistical) for safeguards at Rokkasho is ~0.5%, then a $1\sigma$ error on one throughput will give ~40 kg Pu per year.

- $2\sigma$ will give you 80 kg, or ~6.67 kg/month
- $3\sigma$ will provide ~10 kg/month

With a Significant Quantity value of 8 kg for Pu, this situation does not meet the goal for timely detection, and the quality of the overall safeguards will have to be improved.
The Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed in what year?

(A) 1961  
(B) 1966  
(C) 1968  
(D) 1970  
(E) 1975
iClicker Question

The Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed in what year?

(A) 1961

(B) 1966

(C) 1968

(D) 1970

(E) 1975
The Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) went into force what year?

(A) 1968  
(B) 1970  
(C) 1975  
(D) 1982  
(E) 1995
iClicker Question

The Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) went into force what year?

(A) 1968
(B) 1970
(C) 1975
(D) 1982
(E) 1995
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature in what year?

(A) 1981

(B) 1987

(C) 1991

(D) 1993

(E) 1996
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature in what year?

(A) 1981

(B) 1987

(C) 1991

(D) 1993

(E) 1996
iClicker Question

The Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed in what year?

(A) 1981
(B) 1987
(C) 1991
(D) 1993
(E) 1996
The Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed in what year?

(A) 1981

(B) 1987

(C) 1991

(D) 1993

(E) 1996
The Strategic Arms Reduction (START I) Treaty was signed in what year?

(A) 1981  
(B) 1987  
(C) 1991  
(D) 1993  
(E) 1996
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) was signed in what year?

(A) 1981
(B) 1987
(C) 1991
(D) 1993
(E) 1996
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) was signed in what year?

(A) 1981  
(B) 1987  
(C) 1991  
(D) 1993  
(E) 1996
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) was signed in what year?

(A) 1981

(B) 1987

(C) 1991

(D) 1993

(E) 1996