Plan for This Session

Questions about the course

News and discussion

Module 4: Nuclear Terrorism
U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel on Monday said the nation would keep its air-land-sea approach to the nuclear arsenal, despite new Pentagon spending cuts.

"We ... preserve all three legs of the nuclear triad," he said in a lengthy statement at a Defense Department press conference, mostly devoted to conventional-warfare preparedness. "We'll make important investments to preserve a safe, secure, reliable and effective nuclear force."

Speaking alongside Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey, the defense secretary laid out a series of reductions he said were necessary for maintaining military readiness and rebalancing the force structure to address future threats.
Al Jazeera reports that Premier Netanyahu incorrectly characterized the status of Iran’s nuclear program in his speech to the UN in 2012.

Mossad contradicted Netanyahu on Iran nuclear programme

Spy Cables reveal Mossad concluded that Iran was not producing nuclear weapons, after PM sounded alarm at UN in 2012.

Will Jordan, Rahul Radhakrishnan | 23 Feb 2015 19:20 GMT | Iran, Israel
Al Jazeera reports that Premier Netanyahu incorrectly characterized the status of Iran’s nuclear program in his speech to the UN in 2012.

Less than a month after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's 2012 warning to the UN, General Assembly that Iran was 70 per cent of the way to completing its "plans to build a nuclear weapon". Israel’s intelligence service believed that Iran was "not performing the activity necessary to produce weapons".

A secret cable obtained by Al Jazeera’s Investigative Unit reveals that Mossad sent a top-secret cable to South Africa on October 22, 2012 that laid out a "bottom line" assessment of Iran's nuclear work.

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Such activities, however, "will reduce the time required to produce weapons from the time the instruction is actually given".

That view tracks with the 2012 US National Intelligence estimate, which found no evidence that Iran had thus far taken a decision to use its nuclear infrastructure to build a weapon, or that it had revived efforts to research warhead design that the US said had been shelved in 2003.
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Why would Mossad send a top-secret cable to South Africa?

The article may be constructing the content of the Mossad cable from the 2012 US National Intelligence estimate ....
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Netanyahu’s concern is that the nuclear program in Iran reduces the “breakout time between a decision to develop nuclear weapons and the deployment of actual nuclear weapons. The massive enrichment of Uranium to 20% U-235 make this possible. The remaining enrichment from 20% to 90% and warhead design is probably less than 30% of the job.

Why would Mossad send a top-secret cable to South Africa?

The article may be constructing the content of the Mossad cable from the 2012 US National Intelligence estimate ....
The question of how long any agreement would endure is a critical one: President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry have said they will not sign an agreement that would give Iran the ability to produce enough fuel for a nuclear weapon in less than a year should it decide to “break out” of the accord. But it is also an issue that has sharply divided the two sides. While the United States has long insisted that an agreement to limit Iran’s nuclear program endure for a prolonged period, which could be 15 years or more, some Iranian officials have argued that an agreement allow their country to ramp up the number of centrifuges to enrich uranium in seven years or less.
Topics covered in this module:
Part 1: Terrorism and how to counter it
Part 2: Reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism

Sources:
What Terrorists Want, by Louise Richardson
Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism, by Charles D. Ferguson
Articles on Reading Assignments Page
Terrorism and How to Counter It
The Importance of Understanding Terrorism

Endeavoring to understand or explain terrorism is not to sympathize with it.

Instead, understanding the appeal of terrorism is the best way to effective counterterrorism policies.

Example: Gaining an understanding the Shining Path Maoist movement in Peru was much more effective in countering it than attempting to smash it —

- It had 10,000 members in the 1980s and controlled a large area of Peru
- Thousands of armed military and paramilitary forces were deployed over 20 years
- Shining Path and military units killed ~ 70,000 people, but terrorism did not diminish
- Only when the government established a special 70-man intelligence unit to study the Shining Path was it successfully countered
- The intelligence unit discovered that the leadership of the movement was highly centralized and depended on the academic Abimael Guzmán
- They studied everything about him and discovered he had a particular skin condition
- By old-fashioned police work and good electronic intelligence, Guzmán was tracked down though his medical prescription and captured with several of his top lieutenants

*The Shining Path never recovered*
Terrorism and How to Counter It

Topics covered here and in the readings —

• What is terrorism?
• Where have terrorists come from?
• What causes terrorism?
• The three Rs of terrorism
  \textit{(Revenge, Renown, Reaction)}
• Why do terrorists kill themselves?
• What changed on 9/11 and what did not
• What is to be done?
Categories of Violent Political Activity (Important)

**Terrorism:** Deliberately and violently targeting civilians for political purposes (all 4 criteria must be met)

**Insurgency:** An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. Insurgents may or may not commit terrorist acts.

**Guerilla warfare:** A type irregular warfare and combat in which a small group of combatants use mobile military tactics in the form of ambushes and raids to combat a larger and less mobile formal army. Guerilla warfare is not terrorism.

**Regular armed forces:** Must satisfy the four Hague Convention (Hague IV) conditions (1899 and 1907): (1) be commanded by a person responsible to a party to the conflict, (2) have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance, (3) carry arms openly, and (4) conduct operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
What is Terrorism?

Terrorism is deliberately and violently targeting civilians for political purposes.

Terrorism often (but not always) has 3 other characteristics —

1. The point of terrorism is not to defeat the enemy but to send a message.
2. The act and the victim usually have symbolic significance.
3. The victim of the violence and the audience the terrorists are trying to reach are not the same.
Richardson argues that to have a clear understanding of the behavior of terrorist groups, we must understand them as sub-state actors. Although states and their leaders are not terrorist groups, states may engage in terrorism.

The terrorism committed by states can be divided into three categories:

1. **State-sponsored terrorism**: State sponsorship of terrorist acts against inhabitants of other countries as an instrument of foreign policy.

   For example, to hurt other countries without risking the consequences of overtly attacking them (e.g., Libyan support of terrorist acts against U.S. interests during the 1980s, Iraqi support of Palestinian terrorist acts against Israel during the 1990s, Iranian support of terrorism against Israel by Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza).

   For example, as a way to engage in proxy warfare or covertly bring about internal change in another country without risking a direct confrontation (e.g., U.S. support of terrorist groups in Angola and Nicaragua).
Terrorism Carried Out by Governments – 2

2. **State terrorism**: Use of terrorism by a government against its own citizens, to coerce them into accepting the government’s authority (examples: Germany in the 1930s, Argentina in the 1970s, Iraq in the 1980s and 1990s).

3. **War terrorism**: Use of terrorism by a government against the civilians of another country with which it is at war (examples: the German and Allied bombing campaigns in World War II, which damaged London and destroyed Coventry, Dresden, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki and were deliberate efforts to target civilian populations in order to force the hands of their governments).

Collective punishment of communities that produce partisans is another example of targeting civilians to achieve political ends and is therefore terrorism (example: collective punishment of villages of resistance fighters in the Ukraine, Italy and France through German troops in WWII).
Richardson points out that:

- Terrorism, even religious terrorism, is neither new nor the primary preserve of Islam
- Terrorists have sometimes later become statesmen

She argues that the causes of terrorism are not to be found in objective conditions of poverty or privation or in a ruthless quest for dominance, but rather in a “lethal triple cocktail” that combines —

1. a disaffected individual
2. an enabling community
3. a legitimizing ideology

*Richardson argues that terrorists are neither crazy nor amoral but rather are rationally seeking to achieve a set of objectives within self-imposed limits.*
Richardson argues that —

- The behavior of terrorists can be understood in terms of
  - long-term political objectives, which differ across groups
  - more immediate objectives, which are shared by terrorists with very different long-term objectives

- Terrorists’ generally have much more success achieving their immediate objectives than achieving fundamental change.

- When terrorists act, they are seeking 3 immediate objectives (the “3 Rs”):
  - to exact revenge
  - to achieve renown (glory)
  - to force their adversary to react
There are 3 standard phases in an inexperienced society's reaction to terrorism —

Phase 1: Demonstrate resolve by adopting a draconian response that goes largely unchallenged by the public

Phase 2: Polarization of politics —

- The right demands tougher measures and denounces opponents as unpatriotic
- The left objects to many coercive measures

Phase 3: More reasoned reflection, when —

- Draconian measures have failed to produce the desired results
- The adversary has demonstrated his implacable commitment to harming the nation
Six Basic Rules for Containing Terrorism

Rule 1: Have a defensible and achievable goal

- If the goal of the U.S. is to defeat terrorism or eliminate terrorism, it can never be achieved.
- By contrast the goal to capture those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, has been achievable.
- *Containing* the threat of terrorism *is* achievable.
- By keeping this more modest and concrete goal firmly in sight and planning accordingly, the U.S. can ensure that its short-term tactics do not undermine its long-term goals.

Rule 2: Live by your principles
Rule 3: Know your enemy
Rule 4: Separate the terrorists from their communities
Rule 5: Engage others in countering terrorists with you
Rule 6: Have patience and keep your perspective

U.S. counterterrorism policy after 9/11 did not initially follow these six rules, but improved with time.
Example: US Reaction to 9/11

Richardson argues that the early response was marked by two significant mistakes and two major missed opportunities

Mistakes:
- declaration of a “global war on terror”
- conflation of the threat posed by al-Qaeda with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein

Missed opportunities:
- the opportunity to educate the American public to the realities of terrorism and the costs of U.S. sole superpower status
- the opportunity to mobilize the international community behind the U.S. in a transnational campaign against transnational terrorists
Richardson argues that the declaration of a “global war on terror” — has been a mistake and is likely to fail

She argues for a different approach —

• appreciate the factors driving the terrorists
• deprive them of what they need
Key Questions for Countering Terrorism

In thinking about counterterrorism policies, the question should not be

• Who’s tough on terrorists?
• Who’s soft on terrorists?

What matters is —

• What actions are effective against terrorism?
• What are their costs?

We are likely to experience terrorism in the future, just as we have in the past.

We are going to have to learn to live with and accept it as a price of living in a complex world in which communication is relatively easy.
The Relation of Democracy to Terrorism

Through improved security measures and enhanced intelligence, we can protect ourselves against the most dangerous weapons and the most sophisticated attacks.

It’s important to remember that —

• Terrorists cannot derail our democracy by planting a bomb in our midst

• Our democracy can be derailed only if we conclude that it is inadequate to protect us

• Democratic principles are the strongest weapons against terrorists
Reducing the Threat of Terrorism

Richardson argues we should recognize that —

• Terrorism will continue to be employed as long as it is deemed effective
• Technological developments will make it easier for ever smaller groups to employ weapons of ever greater lethality against us
• Political, social, and economic developments will continue to produce disaffected individuals
• We will never be able to prevent every attack, but we can control our reaction to those attacks

*If we keep terrorist attacks in perspective and recognize that the strongest weapons in our arsenal against terrorism are precisely the hallmarks of democracy that we value, then we can contain the terrorist threat.*
Which of the following is *not* a defining characteristic of terrorism?

A. The act must be violent or threaten violence  
B. The violence must be against civilians  
C. The individual victims must be randomly chosen  
D. The violence must be deliberate  
E. The violence must have a political purpose
Which of the following is *not* a defining characteristic of terrorism?

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Terrorism

Which of the following is not one of the “lethal triple cocktail” of factors that Richardson argues leads to terrorism?

A. Extreme poverty
B. A disaffected individual
C. A legitimizing ideology
D. An enabling community
Terrorism

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B. **A disaffected individual**
C. **A legitimizing ideology**
D. **An enabling community**
Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism
Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism

Two Ongoing Parallel Approaches

1. Invasion and war (has led to insurgencies)

2. Cooperative efforts to secure or intercept nuclear explosive materials
Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIS/ISIL)

Which countries see groups declaring affiliation with ISIL?

A. Iraq
B. Syria and Iraq
C. Syria, Iraq and Lybia
D. Syria, Iraq, Lybia and Afghanistan

Why these countries?
Regions Controlled by ISIS in Syria and Iraq

ISIS builds power
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has advanced quickly through Sunni-dominated regions in the fragmented countries of Iraq and Syria.

Ethnic composition

SOURCES: Washington Post; Associated Press; Institute for the Study of War; Long War Journal; Columbia University’s Gulf 2000 project

Boston Globe – June 2014
Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIS/ISIL)

Which countries see groups declaring affiliation with ISIL?

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D. Syria, Iraq, Lybia and Afghanistan

Groups that have declared allegiance to ISIL also in Lybia and Afghanistan!
See for example NPR Feb-18:

http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2015/02/18/387149112/how-isis-has-expanded-beyond-its-syrian-stronghold
Origin of Foreign Fighters vs Richardson’s lethal cocktail: disaffected individual, enabling community, legitimizing ideology

Recent cases of terrorism in Australia, France, Denmark and Belgium (attempt)
Several countries are capable of developing mechanisms to launch SRBMs, MRBMs, or land-attack cruise missiles from forward-based ships or other platforms.

**U.S. territory is more likely to be attacked with [nuclear weapons] using non-missile delivery means**—most likely from terrorists—than by missiles, primarily because non-missile delivery means are —

- less costly
- easier to acquire
- more reliable and accurate

They also can be used without attribution.

— Unclassified summaries of past National Intelligence Estimates of Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015
In Pictorial Form ...
A possible (?) Scenario

I) Select high profile symbolic target eg NATO summit (Chicago in May of 2012 with all NATO heads of state present)

II) Smuggle fissile material and other weapon’s components illegally into the country.

III) Rent nearby house or apartment to setup nuclear device.

chicagotribune.com

Trial to begin of three charged with planning attacks at NATO summit

Mary Wisniewski

Reuters

7:31 AM CST, January 21, 2014

CHICAGO (Reuters) - Opening statements are due to begin on Tuesday in the trial of three men accused of plotting to attack high-profile targets, including President Barack Obama’s re-election campaign headquarters, during the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago.

Brent Betterly, 25, Brian Church, 25, and Jared Chase, 29, are being prosecuted under an Illinois antiterrorism law adopted after the September 11, 2001 al Qaeda attacks.
Plan for This Session

Questions about the course

News

The threat of nuclear terrorism
The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism

Terrorist pathways to a nuclear bomb —

• Stealing a bomb

• Buying a bomb

• Building a bomb
Stealing a Bomb

• About 25,000 nuclear weapons are in arsenals, with all but about 1,000 in Russia and the United States

• Stealing a bomb would be difficult but not impossible

• Activating a stolen bomb would be difficult —
  – The weapons of the United States, Britain, China, and France are protected by specialized security codes (permissive action links = “PALs”)
  – Most but not all Russian weapons have PALs
  – Whether the weapons of India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea use PALs is unknown

There are serious concerns about the security of Pakistani nuclear weapons and Russian tactical nuclear weapons.
• Nuclear-armed states are unlikely to sell a nuclear weapon because of the prospect of devastating retaliation

• But deterrence hinges on a credible retaliatory threat and credible evidence that a weapon transfer has occurred

• Gathering evidence that an explosion was produced by a transferred weapon is difficult

• Nuclear forensics and nuclear event attribution programs receive increased attention following the National Defense Authorization Act of 2010

  ➔ Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act signed 2-16-2010 to establish the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center within Homeland Securities Domestic Nuclear Defense Office (DNDO).
More likely routes for terrorists to buy or be given a nuclear weapon —

- Corruption among nuclear custodians
- Nuclear black markets
- A coup that brings to power officials sympathetic to terrorists

Pakistan is of particular concern —

- It has a relatively new nuclear command and control system
- Taliban and al-Qaeda forces have a formidable presence
- Elements in Pakistan’s military intelligence agency sympathize with the Taliban
- Concerns with regards to stability: eg. Pakistani leaders have been frequent assassination targets
- The infamous (A.Q. Khan) black market originated in Pakistan
Some problems that terrorist organizations wishing to construct a nuclear explosive would confront —

- Assembling a team of technical personnel
- Substantial financial costs
- Radiation and chemical hazards
- Possibility of detection
- Acquisition of nuclear-explosive material
No terrorist organization currently has the ability to produce weapons-
usable enriched uranium.

Hence terrorists would have to acquire already made HEU.

There is enough HEU in worldwide stockpiles to make ~ 30,000 bombs.

Most HEU is under military control, but 40 countries have civilian HEU,
including in more than 120 research reactors and related facilities.

The HEU stockpiles most vulnerable to theft are in Pakistan, Russia,
and many countries with civilian reactor facilities.
No terrorist organization currently has the ability to make plutonium for a weapon. Nuclear reactors to produce plutonium and reprocessing plants to extract plutonium from spent reactor fuel require resources available only to States.

Hence terrorists would have to seize plutonium from existing stockpiles or receive aid from a State.

There is enough plutonium worldwide to make ~ 30,000 bombs.

Plutonium is under both military and civilian control.

Both pose a risk. The United States, Britain, France, and Russia have stopped producing plutonium for weapons. China may have stopped.

India, Israel, Pakistan and possibly North Korea are continuing to make plutonium for weapons.
To make a Hiroshima-style gun-type bomb, terrorists would need about 50 kg (110 pounds) of weapons-grade HEU.

They could try to reduce the amount needed by using special techniques.

An implosion-type bomb can use either HEU or Pu, but the technical challenges are significant —
  • Designing high explosive lenses
  • Machining and assembling precision parts
  • Triggering the implosion

A simple implosion-type bomb would require only 25 kg (55 pounds) of HEU or 4 to 10 kg (9 to 22 pounds) of Pu

Terrorists would be aided by the fact that they would not need to meet military requirements.

*The key barrier for terrorists is acquiring enough HEU.*
The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism

Insecure Nuclear Explosive Materials
The Problem of Dual Use of Highly Enriched Uranium

HEU is also used in civilian applications: research reactors, medical isotope production.

It is challenging to protect HEU in civilian facilities from theft or from secret transfer of HEU to a clandestine weapons program.
Atoms for Peace

• During the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. Atoms for Peace program and the corresponding Soviet program constructed hundreds of research reactors, including reactors for export to more than 40 other countries.

• These reactors were originally supplied with low-enriched Uranium (LEU), which is not usable for nuclear weapons, but demands for better reactor performance and longer-lived fuel led to a switch to weapons-grade Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU).

• In addition there are important medical applications for isotopes that require HEU for their production.
Availability of Highly Enriched Uranium

Effect of “Atoms for Peace”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity of Civilian HEU (kg, end of 2005)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More than 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 - 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleared of HEU (less than 1 kg)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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FKL Dep. of Physics ©2015
In 1994, Building 116 at the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow had enough HEU for a bomb at its research reactor, but had an overgrown fence and no intrusion detectors or alarms, an example of the poor state of security at many nuclear facilities after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Availability of Nuclear Weapon Materials in the Former Soviet Union in the 1990s

The situation in Former Soviet Republics triggered intense efforts to collect and secure nuclear materials. Example, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), collects Pu, HEU and converts civilian HEU reactors to LEU.

Much progress has been made in securing nuclear materials in former SU states!

Left and below: Inadequate security measures at former Soviet nuclear facilities, such as the padlock and wax seal shown, would allow easy access to anyone wishing to steal materials.
Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism

Programs to Intercept and Secure Nuclear Materials
Terrorists organizations known to have sought nuclear weapons or weapon materials —

- Al-Qaeda
- Jemaah Islamiyah
- Chechnyan Separatists
- Hezbollah
- Aum Shinrikyo

Border Security —
15 million shipping containers enter the U.S. each year; only 6% are inspected carefully
What do ceramics, bananas, and kitty litter have to do with border security?

They naturally contain radioactive isotopes and accounted for 80 percent of the over 10,000 radiological false alarms made by portal monitors between May 2001 and March 2005.
Port Scanners: Avoiding False Positive Alarms
Passive Muon Tomography

Solution: detect scattering of cosmic ray muons of high-z nuclei in nuclear explosive materials! Very specific, low number of false positive alarms.

UIUC nuclear physics graduate Dr. Mike Sossong helped to develop this technology at Los Alamos National Laboratory and now is director of research at Decision Science Corporation in San Diego.

Dr. Sossong won the 2011 Columbus Scholar Award of the Homeland Security Department for commercializing this technology
Research on active interrogation for NEM using neutrons

Example:

Brent Heuser, Ling Jian Meng at NPRE and MGP in physics
“Interrogation of Special Nuclear Material Using the UIUC Pulsed Neutron Facility”
funded by the UIUC Engineering College Strategic Research Initiative

Idea: neutrons get captured by nuclides
In the resulting decay gamma rays of characteristic energy are emitted.

NPRE Student (former 280 TA)
Rick Kustra with a gamma detector used
Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism

Identifying the Sources of Dangerous Nuclear Materials (Nuclear Forensics)
**Nuclear Attribution** is the process of identifying the source of nuclear or radioactive material used in illegal activities, to determine the point of origin and routes of transit involving such material, and ultimately to contribute to the prosecution of those responsible.

**Nuclear Forensics** is the analysis of intercepted illicit nuclear or radioactive material and any associated material to provide evidence for nuclear attribution.
Nuclear Forensic Techniques

Electron Microscopy and Spectroscopy

• Typography, morphology, elemental composition, and crystallographic structure

• Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) produces images of the surface at high magnification.

• Transmission Electron Microscopy (TEM) uses electrons that pass through the sample to produce images of the internal structure.

Source: Analyst, 2005: 130
Nuclear Forensic Techniques

Profilometry —
• Measures the surface roughness of fuel pellets.

• Production facilities use two types of grinding procedures to reach the desired cylindrical shape: dry grinding and wet grinding. Wet grinding produces a smoother finish.

Size and features —
• The dimensions of the fuel pellet, including the height, radius, and the type of hole present (if any), are specific to certain types of reactors.

http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/threat/russia.asp
Analyst, 2005: 130
15p280 Nuclear Terrorism, p. 65
FKL Dep. of Physics ©2015
Nuclear Forensic Techniques: Spectroscopy

Isotopic composition reveals the enrichment process, intended use, and reactor type.

Impurity composition reveals the production process and previous geolocation.
Age —

• As a radiological sample gets “older,” the parent isotope disintegrates and its daughter nuclides accumulate.

• Knowledge of the age helps an analyst identify when the material was produced.

$^{18}\text{O}/^{16}\text{O}$ Ratio —

• Certain ratios are observed in rainwater, and these “variations up to 5 percent...depend upon average temperature, average distance from the ocean, and the latitude” (Mayer).

• By these means, an analyst can identify the former geolocation of the material.
Nuclear Forensic Techniques: Conclusion

• By using the techniques and analysis methods of nuclear forensics, one can create a “nuclear fingerprint” of the material.

• Information, such as material type, reactor type, production plant, production date, enrichment process, intended use, and geolocation, are pieces of the puzzle that must be solved to form a bigger picture of the radiological evidence’s history.
Securing Vulnerable Nuclear Materials

Highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium — the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons — exist in dozens of countries, with security that ranges from excellent to appalling. Programs sponsored by the Energy and Defense departments help remove such materials to secure locations and assist other nations in improving security at facilities that hold nuclear materials. The map below charts progress that was made in fiscal 2006:

- **Symbols**
  - Enriched uranium removed (measured in kilograms)
  - Security upgrades completed at nuclear material building
  - Security upgrades completed at nuclear warhead site
  - HEU-fueled research reactor shut down
  - HEU-fueled research reactor converted to low-enriched uranium
  - HEU-fueled research reactor with security upgrades completed

- **Key**
  - Has plutonium (Spain)
  - Has highly enriched uranium (HEU)
  - Has both

**Other Countries**
- Canada: 23.2 kg
- United States: 4 shut down, 2 converted
- Argentina: 3.7

The following countries have sufficient plutonium or HEU but are not shown:
- Canada
- Australia
- U.S.
- Vietnam
- Mexico
- Taiwan
- Argentina
- Japan
- South Africa
- North Korea

**Sources:**
- Harvard University’s Project on Managing the Atom, Nuclear Threat Initiative and Energy Department

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Securing Vulnerable Nuclear Materials

2004 National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) establishes Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) in the Office

→ identify, secure, remove and/or facilitate the **disposition of high risk vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials** around the world that pose a threat to the United States and the international community.

Three initiatives are:

**Convert**: Convert or shutdown research reactors and isotope production facilities from the use of highly enriched uranium (**HEU**) to low enriched uranium (**LEU**).

**Remove**: Remove or confirm the **disposition of excess nuclear and radiological materials**.

**Protect**: Protect high priority nuclear and radiological materials from theft.
GTRI Conversions Since May 2004

(1) Successfully converted to LEU fuel or verified the shutdown of 49 HEU research reactors in 25 countries: Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Japan, Kazakhstan, Libya, the Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

(2) Verified the cessation of the use of HEU targets for isotope production in Indonesia.

(3) Accelerated the establishment of a reliable supply of the medical isotope molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) produced without HEU by establishing partnerships with South Africa, Belgium, and the Netherlands to convert Mo-99 production from HEU targets to LEU targets, and with four domestic commercial entities to produce Mo-99 in the United States with non-HEU technologies.
GTRI Removal Since May 2004

(1) **Removed or confirmed the disposition of more than 4,100 kilograms of HEU and plutonium** (more than enough material for 165 nuclear weapons).

(2) **Removed all weapons-usable HEU from 16 countries** and Taiwan, including: Greece (December 2005), South Korea (September 2007), Latvia (May 2008), Bulgaria (August 2008), Portugal (August 2008), Romania (June 2009), Taiwan (September 2009), Libya (December 2009), Turkey (January 2010), Chile (March 2010), Serbia (December 2010), Mexico (March 2012), Ukraine (March 2012), Austria (December 2012), and Czech Republic (April 2013).

(3) **Removed more than 36,000 disused and unwanted radiological sources from sites across the United States.**
GTRI Protection Since May 2004

(1) Completed physical protection upgrades at more than 1,700 buildings in the United States and internationally with high-activity radiological sources;

(2) Provided Alarm Response Training to more than 3,000 site security, local law enforcement officers and other first responders from across the country on responding to a potential incident involving radiological material.
Countries that have given up all HEU

Ukraine
Following Ukraine’s commitment at the April 2010 nuclear security summit in Washington to get rid of all of its HEU by 2012. The last HEU, 128 kg, was removed on March 27th from two facilities in the Ukraine.

South Africa
NNSA has completed a contract with South Africa for the return of U.S.-origin spent HEU fuel to the United States. The contract, signed in August 2010, covers 6.3 kilograms of U.S.-origin HEU spent fuel. HEU was returned August 2011.
Belarus

Belarus has committed to give up its stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) by the end of 2012.

Prior to the agreement, Belarus, Russia, the United States, and the International Atomic Energy Agency conducted two secret operations in which portions of Belarusian HEU were moved into secure facilities in Russia.

In these operations, a total of 85 kilograms of HEU were transported.

Belarus has suspended the agreement in August 2011 over US protests concerning human right violations in Belarus.
Which country has given up all civilian HEU in 2012?

A. Belarus
B. Germany
C. Ukraine
D. Russia
E. France
iClicker
Which country has given up all civilian HEU in 2012?

A. Belarus
B. Germany
C. Ukraine
D. Russia
E. France
Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism

What We Need To Do
What We Need to Do (Important)

In the September/October 2006 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Harvard University professor Graham Allison discusses a “nuclear 9/11” and concludes that “a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States is more likely than not in the decade ahead.”

The centerpiece of a strategy to prevent nuclear terrorism must be to deny terrorists access to nuclear weapons or materials.

To accomplish this, he formulates the doctrine of “Three No’s” —

1. No loose nukes
2. No new nascent nukes
3. No new nuclear weapon states
What We Need to Do (Important)

1. *No Loose Nukes*

Insecure nuclear weapons or materials anywhere pose a grave threat to all nations everywhere.

The international community can therefore rightly insist that all weapons and materials—wherever they are—be protected to a standard sufficient to ensure the safety of citizens around the world.

Russia has been the principal focus of concern for the past two decades, but other countries—such as Pakistan—are of growing concern.
2. No New Nascent Nukes

Construction of any national production facilities for enriching uranium or reprocessing plutonium must be prevented.

The former head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, has said that the existing NPT system made a mistake in allowing non-nuclear weapon states to build uranium enrichment and plutonium production plants.

Closing this loophole will require deft diplomacy, imaginative inducements, and demonstrable readiness to employ sanctions to establish a bright line.
3. No New Nuclear Weapons States

This means drawing a line under the current eight nuclear powers (the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel) and unambiguously declaring “no more”.

North Korea poses a decisive challenge to this policy. But if North Korea is accepted as a nuclear weapons state, South Korea and Japan are likely to follow within a decade, making Northeast Asia a far more dangerous place than it is today.

The spread of nuclear weapons states makes it more likely that nuclear weapons or materials will be sold to others, including terrorists, or stolen by them.
Plan for This Session

Questions

News

Last Best Chance, Video Presentation

Discussion
P5+1 talks on Iran’s Nuclear Program: Today’s coverage in the NY Times

Some info: (1) deadline for structure of agreement by end of March
(2) Possible deal to halt Iran’s nuclear program for 10 years and to place it under strict supervision by the IAEA.
(3) Iran has history of clandestine nuclear sites not monitored by IAEA
(4) Iran has been a sponsor of state terrorism aimed at Israel
(5) Israel + allies concerned with regards to Irans “nuclear intentions”
(6) PM Netanyahu visiting US to warn against compromise with Iran
(7) Conservatives in parliament in Iran and in Congress question proposed deal

What the West Wants

The United States and its negotiating partners want rigorous inspections, limits on the number of centrifuges with which Iran can enrich uranium, and the removal of most of Tehran’s stockpiles of existing fuel. President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry insist on limits that would prevent Iran, should it break an agreement, from producing enough fuel for a nuclear weapon within a year.

“We want to recognize the main goal here is to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. And on that, Israel and the United States agree.”

John Kerry
United States secretary of state
P5+1 talks on Iran’s Nuclear Program: Today’s coverage in the NY Times

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What Iran Wants

Tehran says it should be able to produce nuclear energy for power and medical purposes, and wants an end to sanctions that keep it from shipping oil or accessing global financial markets. The supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has said that Iran would want to build industrial-scale nuclear enrichment capability when a negotiated agreement expires.

“Our negotiating partners, particularly the Western countries and particularly the United States, must once and for all come to the understanding that sanctions and agreement don’t go together.”

Mohammad Javad Zarif
Iran’s minister of foreign affairs
P5+1 talks on Iran’s Nuclear Program: Today’s coverage in the NY Times

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What Critics of the Deal Want

Critics, including Israel, seek the complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, citing Tehran’s history of hiding efforts to produce nuclear fuel and pursue other weapons-related activities. They also object to any deal that would allow limits on Iran’s nuclear program to expire.

Iran is "threatening to destroy Israel, devouring country after country in the Middle East, exporting terrorism and developing capacity to make nuclear weapons, lots of them."

Benjamin Netanyahu
Prime minister of Israel
WASHINGTON — Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel used one of the most prominent platforms in the world on Tuesday to warn against what he considers an ill-advised nuclear deal being negotiated with Iran, culminating a drama that has roiled Israeli-American relations for weeks.

In an implicit challenge to President Obama, Mr. Netanyahu told a joint meeting of Congress that Iran’s “tentacles of terror” were already clutching Israel and that failing to stop Tehran from obtaining nuclear weapons “could well threaten the survival of my country.” The deal Mr. Obama seeks will not prevent a nuclear-armed Iran, he said, but “will all but guarantee” it. “We must all stand together to stop Iran’s march of conquest, subjugation and terror,” Mr. Netanyahu told the lawmakers, who responded with repeated standing ovations.
Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism

Discussion of “Last Best Chance”
End of Nuclear Terrorism Module