TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: WMD

Please take a look at this material as to what we don’t know about WMD. It is big.

Thanks.

Attach.
09/05/02 J-2 memo to SecDef, “Status of Iraqi WMD Programs”

DHR:dh
099902-26

Please respond by ____________

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: JAN 6 2011

X01695/03

SECRET
UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS(S) DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED
09-17-1913
TO: CICS VCJCS ACICS DIS

SUBJECT: Status of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Programs

Sir, a couple of weeks ago SECDEF asked me what we don’t know (in a percentage) about the Iraqi WMD program. We’ve struggled to estimate the unknowns, and the attached briefing sums up our best J2 sense. We range from 0% to about 75% knowledge on various aspects of their program. I’d be happy to discuss further if you wish.

GLEN D. SHAFFER
Major General, USAF
Director for Intelligence, J2

cc:
DR/DIA
SECDEF/MA
DEPSECDEF/MA
ASD/C3I
J3
J5
DDI

Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on 08/29/01
Date of Source: 08/22/02

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SEPARATOR

SECRET/NOFORN/X1
IRAQ: STATUS OF WMD PROGRAMS

The overall classification of this briefing is:

SECRET//NOFORN//X1
IRAQ:  
STATUS OF WMD PROGRAMS

- We assess Iraq is making significant progress in WMD programs
- Our assessments rely heavily on analytic assumptions and judgment rather than hard evidence
- The evidentiary base is particularly sparse for Iraqi nuclear programs
- Concerted Iraqi CCD&D have effectively negated our view into large parts of their WMD program

We don't know with any precision how much we don't know
IRAQ: NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

- We know Iraq has the knowledge needed to build a nuclear weapon without external expertise.
- We are certain many of the processes required to produce a weapon are in place:
  - We think they possess a viable weapon design
  - We do not know the status of enrichment capabilities
    - We think a centrifuge enrichment program is under development but not yet operational
- We do not know if they have purchased, or attempted to purchase, a nuclear weapon.
- We do not know with confidence the location of any nuclear weapon-related facilities.

Our knowledge of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program is based largely — perhaps 90% — on analysis of imprecise intelligence.

71432002
5 Sep 02

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Deleck Div, WHS
Date: JAN 06 2011

SECRET/NOFORN/X1
IRAQ:
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM

• We know Iraq has the knowledge needed to build biological weapons without external expertise
• We are certain all of the processes required to produce biological weapons are in place
  – We know they have produced anthrax, ricin toxin, botulinum toxin and gas gangrene
• We cannot confirm the identity of any Iraqi facilities that produce, test, fill, or store biological weapons
  – A large number of suspect facilities have been identified that could support R&D/production
  – We believe Iraq has 7 mobile BW agent production plants but cannot locate them

Our knowledge of what biological weapons the Iraqis are able to produce is nearly complete...our knowledge of how and where they are produced is probably up to 90% incomplete
IRAQ: CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM

- We know Iraq has the knowledge needed to build chemical weapons without external expertise.
- We do not know if all the processes required to produce a weapon are in place.
  - Demonstrated capability to produce mustard & nerve agents.
  - Lack the precursors for sustained nerve agent production.
- We can confirm the identity of facilities producing feedstock chemicals suitable for CW precursors.
- We cannot confirm the identity of any Iraqi sites that produce final chemical agent.

Our overall knowledge of the Iraqi CW program is primarily limited to infrastructure & doctrine. The specific agent and facility knowledge is 60-70 percent incomplete.
IRAQ:
BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS

• We know Iraq has the knowledge needed to build ballistic missiles without external expertise
• We are certain many of the processes required to produce ballistic missiles are in place
  – We know they can produce short range ballistic missiles (Al Samoud and Ababil-100)
  – We doubt all processes are in place to produce longer range missiles
• We can confirm the identity of most facilities that contribute to ballistic missile production or RDT&E
• We have good information on general storage at production/assembly sites, but little missile-specific data

Our knowledge of the Iraqi ballistic missile program is about half complete for the production process but significantly lacking – less than 25 percent – for staging and storage sites