Following the implementation of both the Atomic Energy Act of 1964 and Executive Order 10450 in 1953, Robert J. Oppenheimer was exposed as a significant threat to national security by the Atomic Energy Commission's personal security board. He had numerous and flagrant personal affiliations with known members of the Communist party, including his own wife. Robert supported many organizations that were unquestionably communist fronts [1].
Throughout his time at Clinton Engineer Works at Oak Ridge, J. Oppenheimer proved to keep matters of top national security a secret. Despite having a clean track record and the trial finding him loyal to the United States, he loses his security rights. This was because his suspicious contact with members of the Communist party counted against him. He should have avoided scandal. When other scientists and government officials expressed interest in the atomic bomb’s development in order to outcompete the Russians, he was not enthusiastic. Member of the government were distrustful of Oppenheimer’s decision-making [2]. He did not understand how to play politics. It wasn’t just his lack of enthusiasm, either. Oppenheimer headed up a committee that discouraged further development for fear that it will lead to an arms race [3]. In short, he had become something of a pacifist and that was not popular in the post-war period. Although history has proved him right, his reasoning for his lack of enthusiasm was not enough to overlook the remaining accusations presented against him.
Manhattan Project Expenditures through August 1945
$20 billion 1996 USD (1% total cost of war\(^2\); .4% GDP at peak\(^1\)) –

Versus Conventional WWII Military Expenditures 1942-1945
- All bombs, mines and grenades — $31.5 billion
- Small arms materiel (not incl. ammunition) — $24 billion
- All tanks — $64 billion
- Heavy field artillery — $4 billion
- All other artillery — $33.6 billion

Manhattan Project Personnel (1944)
130,000 at peak v. total US labor force of 66.3 million

*Includes costs from 1940-42 for the National Defense Research Council and the Office of Scientific Research and Development.

**Excludes $76 million spent by the Army Air Forces on Project SILVERPLATE from September 1943 through September 1945 (Project SILVERPLATE covered the modification of 46 B-29 bombers in support of the Manhattan Project, trained the personnel of the 509th composite bombing group, and provided logistical support for units based at Tinian Island, launching point for the attacks on Japan).

Sources:  
\(^1\)https://www.brookings.edu/the-costs-of-the-manhattan-project/
\(^2\)https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34645.pdf
The Distinction Between Strategic [progressive destruction of warmaking capacity and will to make war] and Nonstrategic [aka tactical: military mission of limited scope] Nuclear Weapons

Definition by Range of Delivery Vehicles

The long-range missiles and heavy bombers deployed on U.S. territory and missiles deployed in ballistic missile submarines had the range and destructive power to attack and destroy military, industrial, and leadership targets central to the Soviet Union’s ability to prosecute the war. At the same time, with their large warheads and relatively limited accuracies (at least during the earlier years of the Cold War), these weapons were not suited for attacks associated with tactical or battlefield operations. Nonstrategic nuclear weapons, in contrast, were not suited for strategic missions because they lacked the range to reach targets inside the Soviet Union (or, for Soviet weapons, targets inside the United States). But, because they were often small enough to be deployed with troops in the field or at forward bases, the United States and Soviet Union could have used them to attack targets in the theater of the conflict, or on the battlefield itself, to support more limited military missions.

Source: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf